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In this report, Knoll argues that the inversion
situation is more nuanced, complex, and
ambiguous than Edward D. Kleinbard
acknowledges, and he challenges Kleinbard’s
claim that U.S. multinationals are on a tax par
with their foreign competitors.
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The ongoing wave of corporate inversions has
generated substantial debate in academic,
business, and policy circles. Inversions are crossborder acquisitions in which a U.S. corporation
acquires a foreign target in such a manner that the
foreign corporation emerges as the parent of the
group that includes the U.S. corporation as a
wholly owned subsidiary.
Critics of corporate inversions have described
inverting companies as “unpatriotic”1 and as
shirking their obligations to pay their fair share of
2
taxes, and have called for federal action to stem
corporate inversions.3 Over its last few years, the
Obama administration took a series of steps to
4
prevent more U.S. corporations from inverting.
Most recently, on April 4, 2016, Treasury released
two sets of proposed and temporary regulations

1

E.g., Max Baucus, “Corporate Tax Shelters: Looking Under the
Roof,” Senate Finance Committee Hearing, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 1:
Some prominent U.S. companies are literally re-incorporating
offshore tax havens in order to avoid U.S. taxes. They are, in
effect, renouncing their U.S. citizenship to cut their taxes. A
partner in one of the firms marketing these so-called “inversion
deals” admitted that some companies may be concerned that it
is unpatriotic to abandon their U.S. corporate citizenship, but
she went on to say that some companies are coming to the
conclusion that “the improvement on earnings is powerful
enough that maybe the patriotism issue needs to take a back
seat.” You heard that right: “Maybe the patriotism issue needs
to take a back seat.” Obviously, very troubling, especially now
as we all try to pull together, most particularly since September
11, as a nation and work together to help our people meet the
problems that we are facing.
2

E.g., in reference to inversions, Rep. Peter Welch, D-Vt., quoted
in Renae Merle’s article, “Obama Criticizes Companies That Leave
U.S. for Lower Taxes,” WashingtonPost.com, Apr. 5, 2016 (“We’re
just hemorrhaging the resources that we need from companies to
pay their fair share.”).
3

J. Clifton Fleming Jr. et al., “Getting Serious About CrossBorder Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical Framework,”
93 N.C.L. Rev. 673, 678-680 (2015); and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
“Corporate Taxation and Corporate Social Responsibility,” 11
N.Y.U.J.L. & Bus. 1 (2014).
4

For a recent explication of this history, see Donald J. Marples
and Jane G. Gravelle, “Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and
Mergers: Tax Issues,” Congressional Research Service report
R43568 (Apr. 27, 2016).
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held abroad by U.S. corporations that could
escape taxation if inversions were freely
8
permitted. Also, some critics of inversions argue
that inverted companies are less closely connected
with the United States than are U.S. corporations
that have not inverted and as a consequence,
inverted companies are more likely to move their
headquarters, employment, investment, and
research and development away from the United
9
States.
In contrast with the critics of corporate
inversions, who have generally applauded the
federal government’s efforts to stem inversions (and
frequently encouraged the government to go further
to prevent them), managers of inverting
corporations protest loudly, claiming they are not
the villains they have been made out to be, but
rather are the victims of an unfair and antiquated
U.S. tax system that dates from a time when
business was much more national than
10
international. These managers blame the U.S. tax
laws — which, they say, hamper their ability to
compete with foreign rivals11 — and call for
fundamental tax reform, including the elimination
12
of U.S. taxation of active foreign income. At the

8

Citizens for Tax Justice, “Fortune 500 Companies Hold a
Record $2.4 Trillion Offshore” (Mar 3, 2016) ($2.4 trillion
unrepatriated profits of U.S. MNCs); Eric Platt, “Top 50 Boardroom
Hoarders Sit on $1 Trillion in Cash,” Financial Times, May 11, 2015
(citing a company analysis that U.S. companies hold about $1.1
trillion in cash overseas). Those earnings are often said to be
“locked out” of the United States. For thoughtful analysis of what it
means for earnings to be locked out, see Fadi Shaheen,
“Understanding Lockout,” 69 Tax L. Rev. 231 (2016); and Shaheen,
“The GAAP Lockout Effect and the Investment Behavior of
Multinational Firms,” 67 Tax L. Rev. 211 (2014).
9

5

Leslie Picker, “How the Pfizer-Allergan Deal Ranks,” New
York Times Dealbook, Nov. 23, 2015 (the equity value of PfizerAllergan deal is $152 billion, which makes the deal the third largest
deal by equity value after Vodafone AirTouch’s $183 billion
takeover of Mannesmann of Germany and AOL’s $165 billion
purchase of Time Warner).
6

Americans for Tax Fairness, Pfizer: Price Gouger, Tax Dodger 5,
Table 1 (2016).
7

Id. at 4-6. Americans for Tax Fairness further argues that Pfizer
is not hampered by its tax situation, but that its effective tax rate is
actually quite low, closer to 7.5 percent than the 25.4 percent that
Pfizer claims, once an adjustment is made for deferred taxes on
overseas earnings. Id. at 4.

E.g., statement of Peter R. Merrill, principal, PwC, hearing
before the Senate Finance Committee, 113th Cong., 2d Sess., at 7-8
(July 22, 2014); and Jeff Malehorn, “Why Corporate Headquarters
Matter to Chicago,” World Business Chicago, Feb. 16, 2016. See also
Arturs Kalnins and Francine Lafontaine, “Too Far Away? The
Effect of Distance to Headquarters on Business Establishment
Performance,” 5 Am. Econ. J. 157 (2013) (distance from
headquarters weakens monitoring, thereby encouraging
companies to locate operations closer to their headquarters); and
Vanessa Straus-Kahn and Xavier Vives, “Why and Where Do
Headquarters Move?” IESE Business School CEPR working paper
no. 650 (Sept. 2006) (noting the importance of headquarters
agglomeration effects).
10

E.g., Walter Galvin, “Why Corporate Inversions Are All the
Rage,” The Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2014.
11

Id. See also Bret Wells, “What Corporate Inversions Teach
About International Tax Reform,” Tax Notes, June 21, 2010, p. 1345
(arguing that the corporate inversions provide “clear and
noncontroversial evidence” that non-U.S. MNCs have a tax
advantage over U.S.-domiciled MNCs in both U.S. and foreign
markets).
12

E.g., Galvin, supra note 10.
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designed to discourage inversions. Two days
later, Pfizer and Allergan announced that they
were abandoning their proposed merger.
The derailed Pfizer-Allergan transaction was
the largest corporate acquisition announced in
2015 (with a total enterprise value of $160 billion
and a total equity value of $152 billion). Had it
been completed, the Pfizer-Allergan merger
would have been the largest pharmaceutical
transaction ever, the third largest corporate
acquisition on record, and the largest corporate
5
inversion to date. Under the merger agreement,
Pfizer, a U.S. domiciliary and the larger of the two
companies, would have become a subsidiary of
Allergan, an Irish domiciliary, thus converting
Pfizer from a U.S.-domiciled parent into a U.S.domiciled subsidiary of a foreign parent
(Allergan).
To critics of inversions, the scuttled PfizerAllergan transaction epitomizes why inversions
need to be stopped. Pfizer holds $148 billion of
untaxed profits abroad, which, if brought back to
the United States, would incur a $35 billion tax
6
liability. If, however, Pfizer had successfully
inverted, it would have been able to get access to
those earnings, which it could use to pay
dividends or repurchase shares, without paying
any U.S. corporate tax on those earnings.7 By some
estimates, there is as much as $2.4 trillion in
untaxed profits ($1 trillion of which is in cash)
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rivals and would not encourage foreign
companies to acquire U.S. companies. In contrast,
the opponents of stricter anti-inversion rules
generally accept that there is a disadvantage.
Accordingly, tightening those rules (without
engaging in fundamental tax reform to eliminate
the tax disadvantage) would make it more
difficult for U.S. companies to compete and
encourage foreign takeovers of U.S. companies.
In a 2014 article,17 Professor Edward D.
Kleinbard leaped into the center of that debate. In
that article, he contended that competitiveness
arguments for corporate inversions are “almost
18
entirely fact-free” and constitute “a false
19
narrative,” and that “international business
‘competitiveness’ has nothing to do with the
20
reasons for these deals.” He concluded that
although the current U.S. tax system “is highly
distortive and inefficient . . . one of the few
deficiencies it has avoided is imposing an unfair
international business tax competitive burden on
21
sophisticated U.S. multinationals.”
Kleinbard and his article have played and
continue to play a highly visible role in public
policy debates over inversions. His article has
been cited for the propositions that U.S.domiciled companies are not tax-disadvantaged
relative to their foreign competitors and that U.S.domiciled companies do not improve their
22
competitive position by inverting. Kleinbard is
also one of the authors of a September 25, 2015,
letter to Congress signed by 24 international tax
experts urging lawmakers not to align the United
States’ international tax system more closely to
those of other major advanced economies by

17

Edward D. Kleinbard, “‘Competitiveness’ Has Nothing to Do
With It,” Tax Notes, Sept. 1, 2014, p. 1055.
18
19
20

13

Joshua Simpson, “Analyzing Corporate Inversions and
Proposed Changes to the Repatriation Rule,” 68 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 673, 703 (2013). See also Wells, supra note 11.
14

See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, “Reluctantly, Patriot Flees
Homeland for Greener Tax Pastures,” The New York Times, July 14,
2014 (discussing testimony of Mylan CEO Heather Bresch); and
Wells, supra note 11.
15

Testimony of Michelle Hanlon, the Howard W. Johnson
Professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management, before the
House Ways and Means Committee, at 3-4 (Feb. 24, 2016). See also
Merrill, supra note 9.
16

Hanlon, supra note 15, at 6-8. See also Merrill, supra note 9.

21

Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1061.

22

E.g., Avi-Yonah and Omri Y. Marian, “Inversions and
Competitiveness: Reflections in the Wake of Pfizer-Allergan,” 41
Int’l Tax J. 39, 40 (Nov.-Dec. 2015) (“This inversion, in our opinion,
provides the clearest rebuke to the frequently made argument that
the reason for the wave of inversions is that the U.S. corporate tax
system is uncompetitive. We agree with Professor Edward
Kleinbard that ‘competitiveness has nothing to do with it.’”);
Marian, “Home-Country Effects of Corporate Inversions,” 90 Wash.
L. Rev. 1, 10 n.44 (2015) (directing readers to see Kleinbard’s article
“for a full-blown rebuttal of the argument according to which
inversions are driven by competitiveness concerns”).
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center of their complaint, U.S. corporations claim
that they are taxed more heavily than their foreign
13
rivals on the same income. By inverting, U.S.domiciled companies avoid the U.S. tax system’s
disadvantageous treatment of resident businesses
and place themselves on the same footing as their
overseas competitors. Accordingly, the desire of
Pfizer and other U.S.-domiciled corporations to
invert is a signal that the U.S. international tax
system is punitive in its treatment of U.S.
corporations and needs to be reformed so U.S.based multinational corporations (MNCs) will not
14
want to shift their domiciles.
Proponents of this view argue that if U.S.
companies are prevented from inverting through
transactions in which the U.S. parent retains
control, they would instead become takeover
targets for foreign corporations as long as the U.S.
tax system continues to favor foreign ownership
over domestic ownership of corporate assets.
Thus, unless and until the U.S. federal
government is ready for fundamental tax reform,
the unintended but foreseeable effect of
discouraging inversions is to encourage foreign
15
takeovers of U.S. companies. Moreover,
takeovers would likely produce larger shifts in
headquarters, employment, investment, and R&D
away from the United States than would
inversions.16
As the above arguments suggest, the central
factual issue in the debate between proponents of
stricter anti-inversion rules and their critics is
whether the U.S. tax laws disadvantage U.S.
domiciled companies relative to their foreign
competitors. Proponents of stricter anti-inversion
rules generally deny there is any such
disadvantage. Accordingly, stricter anti-inversion
rules would not hamper U.S.-domiciled
companies in their competition against foreign
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23

Americans for Tax Fairness, “24 International Tax Experts
Address Current Tax Reform Efforts in Congress,” at 3 (Sept. 25,
2015).
24

words, not only has Kleinbard not established his
claim that U.S. companies are not at a competitive
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals, that
claim is more likely than not wrong.
I. Improving Competitiveness Abroad
However, before responding directly to
Kleinbard’s arguments, I briefly set forth the two
closely connected arguments to which he is
responding: (1) that U.S. international tax law
hampers the competitiveness of U.S.-based MNCs
relative to that of non-U.S.-based MNCs and (2)
that U.S. corporations, by inverting, eliminate or
reduce that disadvantage. The first argument
begins with the recognition that the United States
is unique among G-8 countries (and an outlier
among large, market-oriented economies) in that
it taxes the worldwide income of its corporations
(with a tax credit for taxes paid to foreign
27 28
governments on that income ). Under U.S. law,
the active non-U.S. income earned directly by a
U.S. corporation (or by a branch, an
unincorporated entity owned by a U.S.
corporation) is taxed by the United States as it is
earned, whereas the active foreign income earned
by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. parent
corporation is taxed by the United States only
when that income is repatriated to the United
States.29 Thus, the U.S. tax system encourages U.S.
companies with foreign-source income that has
not been taxed at a rate as high as the U.S. tax rate
to earn income through a foreign corporation and
defer repatriation. It is, however, costly for U.S.
companies to defer U.S. taxes by avoiding
repatriation.30 Accordingly, some U.S. MNCs
repatriate and pay the U.S. corporate tax (at which
point they can use the money as they see fit),
whereas other U.S. MNCs defer repatriation and

Id. at 2 (“there is no factual basis for the assertion that U.S.
multinationals cannot compete globally because of the U.S. tax
system”).
25

Kleinbard is not the only proponent of the view that
competitiveness concerns are not a reason for inversions. Other
scholars have also argued that U.S. MNCs are not at a tax-induced
disadvantage relative to their non-U.S. competitors. See, e.g.,
Marian, “Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform
Discourse in the United States,” 32 Va. Tax. Rev. 133, 165-167 (2012)
(discussing a hearing with statements from Avi-Yonah); Fleming,
Robert J. Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay, “Worse Than Exemption,” 59
Emory L.J. 79 (2009) (arguing that the United States’ tax treatment of
foreign income is more generous than the taxation of foreign
income under territorial taxation).
26

See testimony of Leslie Robinson, associate professor, Tuck
School of Business at Dartmouth University, before the Finance
Committee, “The U.S. Tax Code: Love It, Leave It, or Reform It!”
(July 22, 2014).

27

Sections 901-904 (provides a tax credit for foreign taxes paid
up to the U.S. tax liability on that income).
28

Philip Dittmer, “A Global Perspective on Territorial Taxation,”
Tax Foundation special report No. 202, at 2 (Aug. 10, 2012) (of the
34 OECD member countries, the number of countries that had
worldwide tax systems declined from 17 in 2000 to seven in 2010;
as of 2010, the only OECD states that had worldwide systems were
Chile, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, and the United
States).
29
30

Section 954(c).
See infra discussion.
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exempting the active foreign income of U.S.
MNCs, advocating instead that the United States
move its international tax system further away
from those of its major trading partners by
adopting “a true worldwide tax system —
23
without deferral.” One of the rationales offered
by the letter’s signatories for their proposal is that
U.S. MNCs are not at a tax-induced competitive
24
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals.
In this report, I offer a response to Kleinbard. I
argue that the situation is more nuanced, complex,
and ambiguous than he acknowledges, that his
claim that U.S. MNCs are on a tax par with their
foreign competitors is not well supported, and that
attaining a more level playing field is one — albeit
not the only — plausible rationale for inversions.25
Ultimately, the claim that U.S. MNCs are on a
tax par with their foreign rivals is an empirical
claim. Unfortunately, there is little, if any,
empirical work directly determining whether
U.S.-based MNCs are tax-advantaged, taxdisadvantaged, or roughly on par with their
foreign rivals and measuring the amount by
which, if any, U.S.-based MNCs improve their
competitive position by inverting.26 As a result,
one cannot at this time clearly and convincingly
describe the magnitude or even the direction of
any such advantage or disadvantage, let alone the
effect of inverting. That said, the stronger case
would seem to be that U.S.-domiciled
corporations are often tax-disadvantaged relative
to their non-U.S. rivals and that they can improve
their competitive position by inverting. In other

SPECIAL REPORT

31

There is a strand of academic literature combining taxation
and corporate governance that views the U.S. worldwide tax
system as the price for the U.S. corporate governance system. E.g.,
Mitchell A. Kane and Edward B. Rock, “Corporate Taxation and
International Charter Competition,” 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1229 (2008);
and Eric L. Talley, “Corporate Inversions and the Unbundling of
Regulatory Competition,” 101 Va. L. Rev. 1649 (2015). However,
most of the tax literature on inversions implicitly assumes that the
corporate governance benefits of incorporating in the United States
are small or nonexistent.
32

Corporations that fund their investments using third-party
debt are not disadvantaged to the extent they use that capital.
Because interest payments are deductible, the earnings on that
capital are not taxed at the corporate level, so differential taxation
of corporations domiciled in different jurisdictions does not affect
their cash flow from third-party debt. Internal debt is different
because the income remains within the corporate group.
33

Readers familiar with the academic literature on capital
ownership neutrality might recognize the argument.

incorporated (regardless of the extent of its
activities in that location).34 Thus, a corporation
incorporated in the United States is a U.S.
corporation and is subject to worldwide taxation
on its income; in contrast, a corporation
incorporated outside the United States is a nonU.S. corporation and is subject to U.S. taxation
only on its income from U.S. sources. Moreover, if
a non-U.S. corporation is domiciled in a country
that has a territorial tax system, it generally will
not pay home-country tax on active income
earned outside its home jurisdiction.
Following an inversion, the parent of the
group is a non-U.S. corporation; however, the U.S.
corporation that inverted is still a U.S.
corporation. As before the inversion, non-U.S.source income earned directly by a U.S.
corporation is subject to immediate U.S. taxation,
whereas non-U.S.-source income earned by a
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation is subject to U.S.
tax when that income is repatriated by the U.S.
corporation. Accordingly, if this were all that
there were to an inversion, inversions would not
ameliorate the tax disadvantage incurred by U.S.
corporations. That is because the foreign income
earned by U.S. corporations and their subsidiaries
35
would still be subject to tax by the United States.
However, following an inversion, corporate
groups often use a variety of tax planning
techniques to shift income that would otherwise
be taxed by the United States to the non-U.S.
parent (or to non-U.S. corporations that are not
subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation) in order to
avoid ever subjecting that income to tax by the
United States. These tactics include shifting
income from subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation to
corporations that are not subsidiaries of a U.S.
36
corporation, allowing the businesses operated
by subsidiaries of a U.S. corporation to wither

34

A notable exception to this general rule is section 7874, which
treats a foreign corporation as a U.S. corporation if the owners of
the U.S. corporation own more than 80 percent of the combined
entity after a merger of a U.S. corporation and a foreign
corporation.
35

The foreign income earned by the foreign parent not through
the U.S. corporation would escape U.S. tax, but that income was
not subject to U.S. tax before the inversion and would not have
been subject to U.S. tax had the MNCs not merged. However, that
income would be subject to U.S. tax if the U.S. MNC acquired the
foreign MNC.
36

Transfer pricing restrictions are imperfect.
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incur the implicit tax costs of doing so and any
explicit taxes (such as having to pay U.S. tax on
interest earnings).
In contrast with the United States and its
worldwide tax system, most countries use
territorial tax systems that exempt the active
foreign income of domestic corporations.
Accordingly, the argument goes, U.S.
corporations are subject to higher taxes than are
many of their competitors on income from nonU.S. sources. Moreover, because corporations
(regardless of domicile) raise capital in a global
marketplace, they must pay investors the same
31
(risk-adjusted) rate of return for their capital.
Thus, the U.S. taxes that a U.S.-based MNC pays
on its foreign-source income are essentially a toll
charge, an incremental tax that is paid when
capital holders invest in the equity of projects that
produce non-U.S. income through U.S.
corporations rather than through non-U.S.
32
corporations. Because U.S. MNCs must earn a
higher before-tax rate of return than their foreign
rivals to achieve the same rate of return after
payment of corporate taxes, the toll charge raises
investment hurdle rates on non-U.S. investments
for U.S. corporations relative to hurdle rates for
foreign corporations, thus rendering U.S. MNCs
less competitive than their foreign rivals in nonU.S. markets.33 This is the outbound argument
that U.S. tax law reduces the competitiveness of
U.S.-domiciled MNCs.
The argument that inversions are a rational
response to that disadvantage begins by
recognizing that U.S. tax law considers a
corporation to be domiciled where it is
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37

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1067.

their foreign rivals on their earnings in foreign
markets, and so they have a more difficult time
competing in those markets than their foreign
rivals. Thus, at its heart, Kleinbard’s claim is that
U.S.-based MNCs are taxed no higher than their
foreign rivals.
Second, the comparatively high U.S. statutory
corporate tax rate of 35 percent (the highest
among OECD countries) does not enter directly
into the argument that the U.S. tax system
disadvantages U.S.-domiciled MNCs relative to
their foreign rivals. The relatively high U.S.
corporate tax rate exacerbates that disadvantage
but does not cause it. The disadvantage comes
from the U.S. worldwide tax system, which
subjects foreign income to U.S. taxation, as long as
the U.S. tax rate on that income exceeds the
source-state tax on that income. Any incremental
tax would have that effect, although the larger the
tax, the larger the effect. Accordingly, but for
deferral, which reduces the present value of the
tax, the disadvantage faced by U.S. corporations
would equal the difference between the U.S.
statutory rate (35 percent) and the tax rate in the
jurisdiction where the income is earned.
Third, as with all such comparative
arguments, there is an implicit assumption that
other considerations are equal. An obvious
example here is the operation of states’ antiabuse
(controlled foreign corporation) regimes, which
have the potential to tax foreign income —
especially income that is shifted across
jurisdictions — at the parent corporation’s tax
rate. This is an issue to which I return later.
Fourth, any claim to the effect that the U.S. tax
system either does or does not disadvantage U.S.
MNCs in their competition with foreign rivals is
ultimately an empirical claim and potentially
quantifiable. Establishing that claim requires
articulating the basis on which companies make
capital budgeting decisions, describing how the
tax law affects those decisions, taking into account
how parties structure their operations in light of
the tax law, and then comparing results across
jurisdictions for companies based in different
jurisdictions.

38

Id. at 1065-1066. To some extent, these techniques have been
curtailed over the last two years since publication of Kleinbard’s
article. See Marples and Gravelle, supra note 4, at 6-13 (describing
recent Treasury notices that have reduced some of the benefits of
inversions).
39

That acceptance is as a factual matter, not as a policy matter.

624

TAX NOTES, MAY 1, 2017
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

while growing the businesses operated by
subsidiaries of the foreign parent,37 and
extensively using borrowing and other
“hopscotch techniques” that shift cash and
income from foreign subsidiaries of the U.S.
corporation to the foreign parent without passing
38
through the U.S. corporation. To the extent that
those tactics are effective, the foreign-source
income of the U.S. corporation is, after the
inversion, no longer subject to U.S. tax. That, in
turn, reduces the hurdle rate on foreign
investments and, with it, the tax-induced
competitive disadvantage experienced by U.S.
corporations in foreign markets.
The above represents what could be called the
outbound account for how the U.S. worldwide tax
system disadvantages U.S. companies in the
competition to earn income in foreign markets,
and how inversions operate as a self-help
mechanism that U.S. corporations use to achieve
territorial taxation and hence eliminate the
disadvantage. The outbound account described
above is the principal target at which Kleinbard
takes aim in his 2014 article. Moreover, of the two
arguments described above — first, that the U.S.
worldwide tax system places U.S.-based MNCs at
a competitive disadvantage relative to their
foreign rivals, and second, that inversions are
effective in eliminating that disadvantage —
Kleinbard takes issue with the first argument
only. He would seem to accept that inversions
could be used to improve the competitiveness of
U.S. MNCs relative to their foreign rivals if it were
correct that U.S. MNCs are at a tax-induced
disadvantage relative to foreign MNCs.39
Before addressing Kleinbard’s arguments,
however, there are several aspects of the
outbound account of how the U.S. tax system
disadvantages U.S. corporations in competition
with non-U.S. corporations in foreign markets
that warrant attention. First and most obviously,
the claim is comparative. The claim takes the form
that U.S. corporations are taxed more heavily than
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The above represents what I have called the
outbound account of inversions and
competitiveness. Under that account, U.S.domiciled MNCs have an incentive to invert
because an inversion improves their ability to
compete with their foreign rivals outside the
United States. There is a second argument that has
been getting more attention recently, that U.S.based MNCs improve their competitive position
in the United States by inverting. Under this
account, inversions improve the ability of U.S.
companies to compete with non-U.S.-based
MNCs for investments in the United States.
The argument is as follows. The United States
taxes all corporations, regardless of domicile, on
their U.S.-source income — with large, successful
businesses taxed at what is an effectively flat rate
of 35 percent. Income, however, is a net concept,
and all corporations regardless of domicile can, in
calculating their net income, deduct their
expenses against their gross income. Generally
deductible expenses include royalties paid on
licenses of intellectual property and interest paid
on debt. Moreover, with some limitations, these
expenses are deductible even if the royalties and
interest payments are paid to the parent (or a
corporation up the chain of ownership) of the U.S.
corporation or another member of the same group
of related corporations. As has long been
recognized, interest and royalty payments are
very effective in shifting the source of income for
tax purposes but otherwise have no economic
significance when transfers are made within the
same group of companies (as long as the ultimate
ownership is the same).
These and similar techniques, which range
from the simple illustrations above to much more
complex transactions with colorful names, such as
the Double Dutch Irish sandwich, create what
40
Kleinbard calls “stateless income.” Stateless
income captures the notion that corporate
managers have flexibility in determining where a
corporation’s income is recognized for tax
41
purposes. And economic studies show that
40

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056.

42

E.g., Kevin S. Markle, “A Comparison of the Tax-Motivated
Income Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and Worldwide
Countries,” 33 Contemp. Acct. Res. 7 (2016) (and sources cited
within).
43

That income is also potentially subject to subpart F, which
currently taxes income from passive investments held by CFCs of
U.S.-domiciled corporations.
44

Kleinbard, “Stateless Income,” 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 699 (2011);
Kleinbard, “The Lessons of Stateless Income,” 65 Tax L. Rev. 99
(2011).
41

corporations shift large amounts of taxable
income from high-taxed states (where many
income-producing activities and sales take place)
to low-taxed states (where little economic activity
and few sales occur).42
Although U.S.-based MNCs can and do shift
income from within the United States to outside,
there is an important difference when foreignbased MNCs engage in income shifting and when
U.S.-based MNCs do so. The difference is that
when a U.S.-based MNC engages in such a shift,
the income shifted out of the United States is still
ultimately subject to U.S. worldwide taxation
43
when it is repatriated back to the United States.
In contrast, once U.S.-source income has been
successfully stripped out of the United States by a
non-U.S.-domiciled corporation, the income can
be repatriated back to the parent at no U.S. tax
cost. Thus, a non-U.S. corporation that strips
income out from the United States permanently
escapes U.S. tax on that income. In contrast, a U.S.
corporation that strips income out from the
United States only defers (possibly indefinitely)
that income from U.S. taxation.
Under U.S. tax law, it is relatively easy for
non-U.S.-based MNCs to strip large amounts of
income out of the United States, thereby
completely and permanently escaping U.S. tax on
that income at very little tax or economic cost. One
simple technique is for the non-U.S. parent to
capitalize the U.S. subsidiary with debt rather
than equity. If the foreign parent were to capitalize
the U.S. entity with equity, the income earned by
the U.S. entity would be taxed in the United
States. In contrast, to the extent the parent uses
debt, the U.S. income is reduced by the interest
payment, with the income generally taxed where
44
the interest is received.

Section 163(j). The limit is effectively 50 percent of earnings
before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization, leaving little
taxable income after depreciation and amortization. Kleinbard,
supra note 17, at 1066 (citing Martin A. Sullivan, “Untangling
Corporate Effective Tax Rates,” Tax Notes, Mar. 16, 2015, p. 1299).

TAX NOTES, MAY 1, 2017

625
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

II. Improving Competitiveness at Home

SPECIAL REPORT

does not describe it as a competitiveness
concern).46 Following Kleinbard, I focus mostly on
the outbound account, but I also consider the
inbound account as his broad claim — that
competitiveness has nothing to do with inversions
— denies the possibility that either account is
correct. I now turn to Kleinbard’s arguments for
why those accounts are wrong.
III. Inversions and the Competitiveness of U.S. MNCs
Kleinbard’s 2014 article is erudite, witty,
forceful, and wide-ranging. Yet, for all the
complex issues and concepts Kleinbard addresses
and the numerous contemporary business
practices and academic studies he weaves into his
narrative, the logical structure of Kleinbard’s
main argument is straightforward. Kleinbard’s
central claim is that U.S.-based MNCs are not at a
competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign
rivals. That claim, in turn, rests on the premise
that when properly viewed through the lens
through which businesses make investment or
capital budgeting decisions, U.S.-based MNCs are
taxed no heavier than their foreign rivals. As
Kleinbard describes it:
Sophisticated U.S. firms operate today, not
under a worldwide tax system, but rather
in an ersatz territorial environment,
without any of the antiabuse rules a
thoughtful territorial tax system would
impose, but subject to a bizarre constraint
that they must park their foreign earnings
offshore to remain within the ersatz
territorial system. This means that in
practice, U.S. firms do capture the benefit
of operating in lower-tax jurisdictions,
both as a cash matter and more
importantly for the purpose of U.S.
generally accepted accounting principles,
which is the lens through which investors
and corporate executives measure a firm’s
47
performance.

46
45

E.g., Wells, supra note 11, at 1352-1356.

47

See Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1066-1068.
Id. at 1056.
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A U.S.-domiciled MNC can also use debt to
reduce its U.S. taxable income, but there is an
important difference. When a U.S.-domiciled
MNC shifts income out from the United States,
that income is still subject to U.S. taxation when it
is repatriated. For the interest payments on the
debt to reduce a U.S.-domiciled corporation’s
income ultimately subject to U.S. tax, the debt
cannot come from the corporate parent or a
related party. To strip the income permanently
beyond the reach of U.S. taxation, the debt must
come from a third party. When debt is provided
by an unrelated third party rather than a related
party, the borrower incurs the economic risks
associated with debt. In contrast, when a U.S.
subsidiary of a foreign parent is financed with
debt from a foreign parent, there is no real
economic difference between using debt or equity,
as long as the parent holds the securities and thus
the economic risks of debt are avoided.
Accordingly, there can be a substantial U.S.
tax advantage from having a foreign-domiciled
parent rather than a U.S.-domiciled parent. In
those circumstances, non-U.S.-based MNCs will
have a tax-induced competitive advantage over
U.S. companies in the competition to own assets,
make investments, and take advantage of
opportunities in the United States. This, in turn,
provides an incentive for U.S.-domiciled MNCs to
invert to improve their competitiveness (not
outside the United States, but rather) inside the
United States.45
It follows that there are two potential
competitiveness accounts that can be told about
inversions. U.S.-based MNCs might invert to
improve their ability to compete with their
foreign rivals for opportunities outside the United
States (the outbound account) or inside the United
States (the inbound account). Moreover, these two
accounts are largely independent of one another.
Both might be true, either one might be true, or
neither one might be true. Accordingly, it is
possible that U.S. tax laws disadvantage U.S.based MNCs relative to their foreign rivals both
without and within the United States. Although
Kleinbard’s focus is on the outbound account, he
also addresses the inbound account (although he
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4. U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not
disadvantaged relative to their foreign
rivals from a cash flow perspective in the
competition to earn income in the U.S.
market (inbound/cash flow perspective).
In his 2014 article, Kleinbard argues that all
four claims are true and that each claim is
supported by the weight of evidence.
By making his case under both financial
accounting and cash flow principles, Kleinbard is
acknowledging the possibility that companies
incorporate taxes into their business and
investment decisions in different ways. Support
for that divergence can be found in a manuscript
posted after publication of Kleinbard’s article.
In a recent working paper, John R. Graham,
Michelle Hanlon, Terry Shevlin, and Nemit Shroff
surveyed tax executives at nearly 2,800
corporations, most of which are domiciled in the
United States, about how their companies
incorporate tax considerations into their business
49
decisions. The tax executives were asked under
various circumstances what is the primary tax
rate their respective companies use to incorporate
taxes into their business decisions, and in each
case they were given a choice of the following
options: “(i) U.S. statutory tax rate [STR], (ii)
[generally accepted accounting principles]
effective tax rate [ETR], (iii) jurisdiction-specific
[STR], (iv) jurisdiction-specific [ETR], (v)
50
marginal tax rate [MTR], and (vi) other.”
Averaging across all responses of the 800
responding companies, the surveys indicated the
following pattern of choice of a primary tax rate:
“25.8 percent use GAAP ETRs, 23.1 percent use
STRs, 19.6 percent use jurisdiction-specific STRs,
17.0 percent use jurisdiction-specific ETRs, 11.2
percent use MTRs, and 3.2 percent use some other
rate.”51 Thus, the most common tax rate to use is
52
the GAAP ETR followed by the STR. Further,
Graham et al. find that public companies are more

49

Graham et al., “Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Making,”
working paper (Mar. 2016) (roughly 750 companies provided
usable responses).
50

Id. at 10.

51

48

There is an important qualification to this statement
regarding antiabuse rules that I take up later in the discussion:
whether U.S. MNCs face a tax disadvantage from a cash flow
perspective.

Id. at 13. The use of jurisdiction-specific ETRs is slightly
higher for mergers and acquisitions (20.1 percent) and slightly
lower for investment decisions (16 percent). Id. at 45, Table 3, panel
A.
52

Id. at 11.
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Accordingly, because U.S.-domiciled MNCs
are not at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage
relative to their foreign rivals, Kleinbard
concludes they cannot improve their relative
position by inverting.
To advance his claim that U.S. tax law does not
disadvantage U.S. MNCs in their competition
with foreign rivals, Kleinbard purports to show
that U.S. companies are not at a disadvantage
from either a financial accounting perspective or a
cash flow perspective. Thus, Kleinbard’s
argument reduces to the claim that the tax rate on
U.S. corporations’ non-U.S. income is non48
positive (zero or negative). Indeed, the claim that
there is no disadvantage faced by U.S. companies
is an argument that the incremental tax is not
merely small, but that it is non-positive.
Moreover, Kleinbard’s main thesis in his 2014
article, that the U.S. tax laws do not disadvantage
U.S.-domiciled MNCs relative to their foreign
rivals from either a financial accounting or cash
flow perspective, implies the following four
claims:
1. U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not
disadvantaged relative to their foreign
rivals from a financial accounting
perspective in the competition to earn
income in foreign markets (outbound/
financial accounting perspective);
2. U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not
disadvantaged relative to their foreign
rivals from a cash flow perspective in the
competition to earn income in foreign
markets (outbound/cash flow
perspective);
3. U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not
disadvantaged relative to their foreign
rivals from a financial accounting
perspective in the competition to earn
income in the U.S. market (inbound/
financial accounting perspective); and
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A. The Financial Accounting Claim
Although Kleinbard argues that U.S. MNCs
do not face a competitiveness disadvantage from
either an accounting or a cash flow perspective, he
expends most of his effort developing the
financial accounting claim. According to
Kleinbard, GAAP “is the lens through which
investors and corporate executives measure a
58
firm’s performance.” There are two versions of
Kleinbard’s financial statement argument.
The simpler version begins with the premise
that both U.S.- and non-U.S.-based companies
evaluate investments (including acquisitions) by
applying their overall worldwide ETRs to
expected earnings regardless of where those
earnings arise and are taxed. According to this
view, U.S. corporations are not at a competitive
disadvantage because their overall ETRs are as
low as (if not lower than) their non-U.S. rivals’
ETRs.
The more sophisticated version of the
argument posits that companies apply marketspecific ETRs — rates that vary across national
markets — to expected earnings. According to
this view, U.S. corporations are not at a
competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign
rivals because U.S. companies have as low (if not
lower) ETRs than do foreign companies in all
national markets.
Although, at various places in his 2014 article,
Kleinbard makes both arguments, he generally
favors the more sophisticated argument on the
ground that such an approach more closely
reflects the manner in which companies make
investment decisions. I begin with the simpler
argument and then address the more
sophisticated argument.
1. Global ETRs.
Kleinbard at times suggests that companies
make investment decisions based on their global
59
or overall ETR. From this perspective, according
to Kleinbard, U.S.-based MNCs are not at a
competitive disadvantage relative to their foreign

53

Id. at 13.

54

Id. at 14-16.

55

Id. at 16.

56

Id. at 16-17.

57

Graham et al. asked tax executives what tax rate their
business “primarily” used, making it unlikely that companies
using more than one tax rate would indicate that they use multiple
tax rates. Another potential problem with the study is that the
authors asked tax managers what tax rate the company used to
make various business and investment decisions. However, those
decisions are not typically made by tax managers but rather by
corporate investment or development officers.

58

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056. Kleinbard also describes
GAAP as “the lens through which all relevant private parties view
a company.” Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1058.
59

For example, in his discussion of Emerson’s unsuccessful
attempt to acquire American Power Conversion (APC), Kleinbard
refers only to the companies’ global ETRs.
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likely than private companies to use ETRs rather
than STRs or MTRs;53 however, larger companies,
high R&D-intensity companies, and companies
with higher institutional ownership are more
likely to use MTRs and less likely to use ETRs for
54
decision-making. However, companies with
large numbers of analysts following them are
more likely to use ETRs and are less likely to use
55
STRs or MTRs. Graham et al. interpret their
results to mean “that companies are more likely to
use the MTR and less likely to use the ETR when
external monitoring mechanisms discipline
56
managers and curb agency problems.”
The recent work by Graham et al.
demonstrates that there is no single method that
all (or almost all) corporations use to incorporate
taxes into their decision-making. Rather, their
work suggests that there is substantial diversity in
the way businesses incorporate taxes into their
decision-making. Thus, some companies might
use a financial accounting approach, whereas
others use a cash flow approach, and still others
likely use both approaches.57 Such a wide
divergence in practice makes it difficult to
describe precisely how taxes affect the capital
budgeting decisions of U.S.-domiciled
corporations, which in turn makes it more
difficult to draw strong conclusions about how
taxes affect the capital budgeting decisions of
U.S.-domiciled MNCs relative to those of foreigndomiciled MNCs. With this caveat in mind, I take
the financial accounting (ETR) and cash flow
(MTR) approaches in turn, assuming in each case
that domestic and foreign MNCs incorporate
taxes into their decision-making in the same
manner (potentially differing only in the rates
they use).
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that of the average non-U.S.-domiciled MNC. For
example, the Avi-Yonah and Lahav study, which
calculated global ETRs of the 100 largest U.S. and EU
public companies from 2000 to 2010, found that the
average profit-weighted global ETR for the 100
largest U.S. public companies was 31 percent and for
EU companies, the corresponding average was 35
percent, a 4 percent advantage for the U.S.
corporations. The PwC study, which calculated
global ETRs for 2,000 companies in 59 countries
between 2006 and 2009, found that the profitweighted U.S. average global ETR was 27.7 percent,
that the unweighted average of global ETRs for the
other 58 countries was 19.5 percent, and that when
each country was weighted by GDP, the average
global ETR of non-U.S. MNCs went up to 24.8
percent. Weighting each country by the number of
observations raised the average global ETR of nonU.S. MNCs further to 25.4 percent, still 2 percent
below the U.S. average.68 The Markle-Shackelford
study, which calculated global ETRs for 11,000
companies domiciled in 82 countries, using data
from between 2005 through 2009, found that the
profit-weighted average global ETR of U.S.
domiciled MNCs was 25.9 percent, the unweighted
average global ETR of foreign jurisdiction MNCs
was 20 percent, and the GDP weighted average was
25.2 percent — 0.7 percent less than the U.S. average.
Accordingly, because all three studies conclude that
the global ETR of the average U.S. MNC is either no
higher than or only slightly higher than that of the
average non-U.S. MNC, these three studies would
all seem to support the argument that U.S.domiciled MNCs do not face a tax-induced
competitive disadvantage than their foreign rivals.
However, a closer look at these studies leans in the
opposite direction.

60

Avi-Yonah and Lahav, “The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest
U.S. and EU Multinationals,” 6 Tax L. Rev. 375 (2012); statement of
Avi-Yonah before the Ways and Means Committee, “How Other
Countries Have Used Tax Reform to Help Their Companies
Compete in the Global Market and Create Jobs,” 112th Cong., 1st
Sess. (May 24, 2011). Avi-Yonah and Marian make this argument as
well in connection with the Pfizer-Allergan transaction. Avi-Yonah
and Marian, supra note 22, at 40.
61

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1057.

62

Id.

63

Sullivan, supra note 44.

64

Avi-Yonah and Lahav, supra note 60.

65

Markle and Douglas A. Shackelford, “Cross-Country
Comparisons of Corporate Income Taxes,” 65 Nat’l Tax J. 493 (2012).
66

PwC, “Global Effective Tax Rates” (Apr. 14, 2011).

67

Sullivan, supra note 44, at 1301.

68

In a blog post, Kleinbard criticized the PwC study. See Paul
Caron, “Kleinbard Critiques PwC Effective Tax Rate Study,”
TaxProf Blog, Apr. 18, 2011. One of Kleinbard’s criticisms is that
simple comparisons of global ETRs overstate the tax burden on
U.S. companies relative to the burden on non-U.S. companies
because the United States imposes a higher statutory tax rate but
taxes on a smaller base as the result of accelerated depreciation and
other faster write-offs. Although accurate as a characterization of
the difference between U.S. and non-U.S. tax systems, the criticism
seems misplaced for a study that is explicitly about global ETRs,
not cash taxes. PwC, supra note 66, at 2 (describing method of
study). It is also a surprising criticism to see from Kleinbard, who
argues that the GAAP effects of taxation are more important than
cash flow consequences of taxation, especially for public
companies. Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056-1057. Of course, as
Kleinbard describes at some length, timing differences do not
reduce global ETRs. Id. at 1058-1060.
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rivals, and therefore, improving competitiveness
cannot be a rationale for inverting because the
overall ETRs of U.S.-based MNCs are as low if not
60
lower than those of their rivals.
This argument has the benefit that it rests on a
few studies of global ETRs of corporations based
in different states. According to Kleinbard, these
studies show that U.S.-based MNCs do not have
systematically higher ETRs than MNCs based in
other nations61:
Whether one measures effective marginal
or overall tax rates, sophisticated U.S.
multinational firms are burdened by tax
rates that are the envy of their
international peers. And this is true
whether one studies cash taxes paid or —
more important in the case of public firms
— U.S. GAAP accounting for taxes.62
63
In a March 16, 2015, Tax Notes column,
Martin A. Sullivan reviews three well-known
economic studies of MNCs’ ETRs. Those studies
are by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Yaron Lahav
64
(2012), by Kevin Markle and Douglas
Shackelford (2012),65 and by
66
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011). All three
studies sought to “measure under accounting
rules, what the worldwide tax burden is of all the
investments made by a corporation domiciled in
country A compared with the same burden of a
corporation domiciled in country B.67
The studies make these comparisons using
different methods, data sources, and time periods.
Nonetheless, all three studies conclude that the
global ETR of the average U.S.-domiciled MNC
either is no higher or is not substantially higher than
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Table 1. Comparison From 2 Studies of
Financial Accounting ETRs
(across 14 jurisdictions and the United States)
PwC

MarkleShackelford

Australia

27.1%

22%

Bermuda

18.4%

11.4%

Canada

21.6%

17.6%

Cayman Islands

4.7%

12.9%

France

23.1%

23.8%

Germany

27.9%

21.9%

India

25.1%

18.5%

Japan

38.8%

36.7%

Malaysia

22.8%

18.2%

South Africa

26.7%

22.8%

22%

15.4%

Switzerland

20.7%

18.5%

Taiwan

14.4%

18.5%

United Kingdom

23.6%

21.8%

United States

27.7%

25.9%

Non-U.S. average
(unweighted)

22.6%

20%

Non-U.S. average
(weighted)

28.3%

25.2%

Jurisdiction

Sweden

Looking at Table 1, we see that the lowest
average global ETRs are for MNCs domiciled in
nations with small populations and little
economic activity (except for tourism and
finance), such as Bermuda and the Cayman
Islands. MNCs domiciled in industrial nations
have substantially higher global ETRs. Among
industrial nations, Japan is an outlier. MNCs
domiciled in Japan, with ETRs in the mid-30
percent range, face the highest ETRs by far.
Depending on the study, MNCs domiciled in the
United States face either the second highest
(Markle-Shackelford — 25.9 percent) or third
highest (PwC — 27.7 percent) average global
ETRs. According to PwC, German-domiciled
MNCs face slightly higher average global ETRs
than do U.S. MNCs (27.9 percent), whereas the
Markle-Shackelford study concludes that German
MNCs face global ETRs 4 percent lower than U.S.
MNCs (21.9 percent).69 For the other 10
jurisdictions covered in the table, including
Australia, Canada, France, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, both the
Markle-Shackelford and PwC studies conclude
that MNCs domiciled in those nations face lower
average global ETRs than their U.S. counterparts.
Thus, it would appear that U.S.-domiciled MNCs
face among the highest ETRs of companies
domiciled in any country. Accordingly, if the
impact of taxes on a company’s competitiveness
can be measured by the company’s global ETR,
U.S.-domiciled MNCs appear to be at a tax
disadvantage relative to MNCs domiciled in
many other jurisdictions. That is because U.S.domiciled MNCs have higher average global
ETRs than MNCs domiciled in most other
advanced economies.
Further, in 2013 Markle and Shackelford
updated their earlier study of global ETRs by
extending their data through 2011 and reached
similar conclusions.70 They summarize their main
result as follows:

69

Source: Martin A. Sullivan, “Untangling Corporate
Effective Tax Rates,” Tax Notes, Mar. 16, 2015, p. 1299,
at p. 1302, Table 3.

According to the PwC study, German-domiciled MNCs faced
average ETRs of 27.9 percent, whereas U.S.-domiciled MNCs faced
ETRs of 27.7 percent. According to the Markle-Shackelford study,
German-domiciled MNCs faced average ETRs of 21.9 percent,
whereas U.S.-domiciled MNCs faced ETRs of 25.9 percent.
70

Markle and Shackelford, “The Impact of Headquarter and
Subsidiary Locations on Multinationals’ Effective Tax Rate,” NBER
working paper 19621 (Nov. 2013).
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Although a corporation might do business in
many countries, it is domiciled in only one
country. The Avi-Yonah-Lahav study compares
companies domiciled in the United States with
those domiciled in Europe and compares the U.S.
average global ETR to the European average
global ETR. In contrast, the Markle-Shackelford
and PwC studies calculate average global ETRs
for MNCs domiciled in each country in the study.
The following table, taken directly from Sullivan’s
column, provides average calculated global ETRs
for MNCs domiciled in different jurisdictions,
including the United States.
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European MNC or even the average German
MNC. The industry makeup is likely to be
different across countries, which could bias
results. Moreover, most companies have
numerous competitors, not just one major
73
competitor, and those competitors are often
based in different states and might have very
different global ETRs.74 A given U.S.-based MNC
might not have the lowest or the highest overall
ETR in the industry. Thus, using global ETRs as a
measure of how taxation affects competitiveness,
a U.S.-based company that has neither the highest
nor the lowest ETR among corporations in its
industry is more competitive than some
companies, but less competitive than others. If
that company inverted and lowered its global
ETR, it would improve its competitive position
relative to all of its competitors. It would reduce
or eliminate the disadvantage relative to those
MNCs with lower global ETRs, while increasing
its advantage over MNCs with higher ETRs.
One of the industries that has experienced a
large number of inversions is healthcare.
According to a report prepared by PwC, U.S.domiciled MNCs have global ETRs that are not
generally the lowest in the industry. In its 2009
report, “Pharma 2020: Taxing Times Ahead,” PwC
calculated five-year average global ETRs for
leading companies in the pharmaceutical,
biotechnology, generics, and medical device
subsectors. That table is reproduced below.

73

The rivalry between Boeing and Airbus for large commercial
aircraft is a notable exception.

71

Id. at 4.

72

74

See generally Marian, “Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate
Tax Discourse in the United States,” 32 Va. Tax Rev. 133 (2012)
(arguing that cross-border comparisons are often used in debates
about international taxation without giving sufficient attention to
why the comparison is being offered or what other differences
between jurisdictions might be relevant but are not acknowledged).

In their 2013 study, Markle and Shackelford find that
industries are taxed similarly around the world in that high-taxed
industries, such as transportation, construction, and finance tend to
be highly taxed regardless of where they are headquartered, and
low-taxed industries, such as information, manufacturing, and the
professions, tend to be lightly taxed. Markle and Shackelford, supra
note 70, at 28, Table 5.
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Our primary finding is that, despite
decades of international tax planning and
continuing reports of elaborate innovative
schemes to avoid taxes, the effective tax
rates of multinationals vary considerably
depending on the situs of the company.
We find dramatic differences in effective
tax rates based on the headquarters of the
multinational. Japanese-headquartered
multinationals face the highest ETRs, by
far. After controlling for industry and size,
their ETRs average 8.5 percentage points
higher than their runner-up counterparts
from the U.S. The ETRs of American
multinationals are slightly ahead of those
from two major trading partners, France
and Germany. On the other end of the
distribution, multinationals from the
Middle East (Tax Havens) enjoy ETRs that
average 12.5 (10.8) percentage points
lower than American firms. In short, we
find that differences continue to persist in
ETRs between high-tax and low-tax
countries despite vast investment in
71
international tax avoidance.
Thus, in their 2013 paper, Markle and
Shackelford reaffirm their earlier conclusion that
U.S.-domiciled MNCs generally have higher global
ETRs than the MNCs from other countries with the
notable exception of Japan. And they emphasize
that this trend persists through 2011 and in the
presence of extensive stateless income tax planning.
The above comparisons are more fine-grained
than simple comparisons of average global ETRs
for U.S.-domiciled and non-U.S.-domiciled
MNCs. The two studies described immediately
above compare the average global ETR of U.S.domiciled MNCs with the average global ETR of
MNCs domiciled in each one of several countries.
In principle, we would want to dig still deeper
and to compare global ETRs across rival MNCs
72
domiciled in different jurisdictions. The average
U.S. MNC does not compete with the average
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Big Pharma

Top 10 Biotech Companies

Location

ETR
(percentage)

Location

ETR
(percentage)

Bayer

DE

29.30%

Cephalon

U.S.

39.19%

GlaxoSmithKline

UK

29.27%

Genentech (pre-merger)

U.S.

36.87%

AstraZeneca

UK

28.21%

Biogen Idec

U.S.

31.60%

Wyeth (pre-merger)

U.S.

26.26%

Genzyme

U.S.

30.00%

Roche

CH

25.83%

Gilead Sciences

U.S.

29.20%

Schering-Plough (pre-merger)

U.S.

25.80%

UCB

BE

27.87%

Johnson & Johnson

U.S.

25.02%

CSL

AU

26.38%

Bristol-Myers Squibb

U.S.

24.24%

Amgen

U.S.

24.34%

Merck (pre-merger)

U.S.

23.24%

Celgene

U.S.

24.00%

Pfizer (pre-merger)

U.S.

18.21%

Actelion

CH

12.26%

Sanofi-aventis

FR

15.91%

Average

Novartis

CH

14.44%

Company

Average

Company

28.17%

23.81%
Top 10 Generics Companies

Top 10 Medical Device Companies

Location

ETR
(percentage)

Location

ETR
(percentage)

Goldshield Group

UK

138.52%

Cardinal Health

U.S.

33.30%

Towa Pharmaceutical

JP

42.44%

Stryker

U.S.

30.50%

Sawai Pharmaceutical

JP

39.31%

Covidien

BM

30.00%

Mylan

U.S.

37.80%

Boston Scientific

U.S.

29.22%

Watson Pharmaceuticals

U.S.

35.93%

Becton, Dickinson & Co.

U.S.

27.57%

Nichi-iko Pharmaceutical

JP

33.96%

Siemens

DE

24.86%

Teva Pharmaceuticals

IL

24.69%

Medtronic

U.S.

24.28%

Pharco Pharmaceuticals

EG

12.61%

Baxter International

U.S.

20.32%

Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories

IN

5.53%

Philips

NL

19.06%

EastPharma

TR

—

General Electric

U.S.

14.85%

Company

Average

37.08%

Company

Average

25.40%

Source: PwC, Pharma 2020: Taxing Times Ahead 7, Figure 5 (2009). East Pharma, established in 2006, had a pre-tax loss in
each subsequent year before the report was published. ETRs for Siemens, Philips, and GE are those reported in their
consolidated accounts.
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Table 2. ETRs of Leading Companies in Four Sectors of the
Pharmaceutical and Life Science Industry
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The next empirical study published on
inversions was a 2004 article by Jim A. Seida and
79
William F. Wempe. Using a sample of 12
inverting companies and 24 matched noninverting companies, Seida and Wempe found
that inverting companies’ global ETRs fell sharply
after inverting. The global ETR for inverting
companies fell 11.57 percent after inverting (from
32.01 to 20.44 percent), whereas the mean ETR for
the control group fell only 3.98 percent (from
34.84 to 30.85 percent).80 Seida and Wempe further
hypothesized that much of the benefit came from
the inverting companies’ avoidance of U.S.
taxation on U.S. earnings.81
To identify the source of the tax savings, Seida
and Wempe closely examined four companies
that inverted in 2002. They concluded that for two
of them, the entire reduction in ETRs was a result
of earnings stripping.82 For the other two
companies, they estimated that earnings stripping
was responsible for 84 percent and 38 percent of
83
the reduction.
In a 2010 report, Bret Wells studied three
companies in the oil field services industry that
inverted in 2002. He compared the companies’
pre-inversion global ETRs for 2000 to 2001 with
their post-inversion global ETRs for 2003 to 2008.
He found that each company’s global ETR
dropped substantially after inverting, with the
84
drops ranging from 7 to 16 percent.
The Desai-Hines, Seida-Wempe, and Wells
articles all found tax savings from inverting.
However, those studies all rely exclusively on
data from inversions that took place before 2004.
Before 2004, U.S. MNCs could invert through
what are called “naked inversions.” The U.S.
company could change residence by merging into

79

Seida and Wempe, “Effective Tax Rate Changes and Earnings
Stripping Following Corporate Inversion,” 57 Nat’l Tax J. 805
(2004).
80

Id. at 820-821, Table 5.

81

75

GE, of course, is a large conglomerate with businesses in
many industries, not just healthcare. According to PwC, GE’s
global ETR is its ETR across the entire company, not GE’s ETR for
healthcare.
76

Desai and Hines, “Expectations and Expatriations: Tracing the
Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions,” 55 Nat’l Tax J.
409 (2002).
77

Id.

78

Id.

Id. at 806-814 (noting a sharp rise in foreign income, but a
much smaller rise in foreign revenue, and a shift in pretax profit
margins).
82
83

Id. at 812-813, Table 2.
Id.

84

Wells, supra note 11, at 1352 (NBR’s global ETR dropped 12
percentage points, from 37 percent to 25 percent; NE’s global ETR
fell 7 percentage points, from 25 percent to 18 percent; and WFT’s
global ETR declined 16 percentage points, from 38 percent to 22
percent).
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Table 2 shows substantial variations in tax
rates across the leading companies in four
subsectors of the pharmaceutical and life science
industry. Only in medical devices, does a U.S.domiciled MNC, General Electric, have the lowest
75
ETR. Thus, if we also look at specific market
sectors, we see that U.S. companies are not always
those with the lowest ETRs. Note that many
inverting companies are in the pharmaceutical
and life science industry, where Swiss
corporations have a large presence. In the PwC
and Markle and Shackelford studies, Swiss-based
MNCs consistently have substantially lower
global ETRs than do U.S.-based MNCs; also, in the
PwC study of taxation of the pharmaceutical and
life science industry, Swiss healthcare companies
often have lower global ETRs than their U.S.
competitors.
Moreover, Kleinbard’s claim that U.S. MNCs
are not at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage
relative to their foreign rivals and thus cannot
improve their position by inverting is not well
supported by the few academic studies that have
looked at the impact of inverting on inverting
corporations’ global ETRs. In 2002 Mihir A. Desai
and James R. Hines Jr. published the first
76
empirical study of inversions. Their article,
which covered the 25 or so inversions that had
been announced through early 2002, examined
the financial statements of companies announcing
inversions and the stock market’s reaction to those
announcements. Desai and Hines found that
investors in the stock market expect inverting
companies to reduce their taxes on both foreignand U.S.-source income when they invert.77 They
further determined that some portion of the
expected tax benefit from inverting is the
opportunity to avoid U.S. rules on interest
78
expense allocation. Thus, they concluded that
there were both outbound and inbound tax
savings from inverting.
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85

Narotzki, “The True Economic Effects of Corporate
Inversions,” Tax Notes, June 27, 2016, p. 1819.

13.89 percent; and for corporations with FMVs
above $10 billion, their average ETR dropped 9.49
86
percent. Thus, Narotzki’s study shows persistent
drops in global ETRs following inversions.
Narotzki’s study raises several questions,
however. The fall in global ETRs following
inversions are surprisingly high, especially the 30.11
percent drop for companies with market values
between $500 million and $1 billion. Moreover,
Narotzki does not describe how he calculates his
averages or what he does with outlier observations.
He also does not compare his results to a control
group of corporations that do not invert. Although
his partitioning of transactions into different
tranches based on market value makes it unlikely
that differences in weighting drove his results, some
of his results might be driven by unusually high or
low (possibly negative) tax rates.
In contrast with Narotzki’s conclusions, a 2016
working paper by Rita Nevada Gunn and Thomas
Z. Lys finds that inversions increase U.S. tax
revenue because inverting companies pay no less
tax after inverting, whereas shareholders pay
87
substantially more tax. Gunn and Lys use a
sample of 108 inversions and acquisitions of U.S.
companies by foreign acquirers between January
88
1, 2004, and December 31, 2015. Thus, Gunn and
Lys combine inverting U.S. MNCs with
acquisitions of U.S. companies by foreign
89
acquirers. They then compare those companies
with a control sample of more than 200 foreign
acquisitions by U.S. corporations in which the
surviving parent entity remained a U.S.
domiciliary.90 Gunn and Lys do not report average
global ETRs for either the inverting companies or
the control group but instead report average ETRs
on domestic and foreign income separately for
both inverting companies and the control group.
Using data from three years before the inversion
and three years after (when available), Gunn and
Lys report an average pre-inversion ETR of 22.3

86

Id. at 1828, Table 10.

87

Gunn and Lys, “The Paradoxical Impact of Corporate
Inversions on US Tax Revenue” (Aug. 21, 2016).
88

Id. at 8.

89

Gunn and Lys lump inverting companies together with
foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies presumably on the grounds
that there are likely to be similar tax advantages from having a
foreign parent.
90

Gunn and Lys, supra note 87, at 8.
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a shell corporation registered in another
jurisdiction. After 2004, the target corporation
could no longer be a shell; instead, the inversion
had to involve a substantial target corporation
with significant assets and business activity.
Those rules, which have been expanded and
tightened since 2004, have made it more difficult
for U.S. MNCs to invert by making it harder to
find an appropriate target. Also, since 2005, when
the repatriation holiday ended, successful U.S.
MNCs have been piling up cash overseas in
apparent anticipation of a new holiday and as
they have become more effective in shifting
income overseas. Thus, one might be reluctant to
draw conclusions about the current situation from
studies based on pre-2004 inversions.
It is therefore surprising, in light of the
attention paid to inversions and the centrality of
global ETRs to much of that debate, that there are
so few recent studies on the impact of inversions
on companies’ global ETRs. In an article
published in 2016, Doron Narotzki looked at 66
inversions that occurred between 1982 and 2015.
He calculated the average global ETRs of
inverting companies for the five years before they
inverted and compared them with the average for
the five years immediately following the
inversion (or less if the inversion occurred less
than five years ago). Narotzki found that
inverting companies on average had ETRs of 20.35
percent for the five years before inverting. After
inverting, the average global ETR dropped 14.5
85
percent to 5.82 percent.
Such a large decline in global ETRs suggests
that the result might be dominated by one or two
very large corporations. However, Narotzki
reports that global ETRs fell after inverting,
regardless of the size of the inverting company.
Corporations with FMVs below $100 million saw
their global ETRs drop 1.94 percent; corporations
between $100 million and $500 million saw their
global ETRs fall 9.64 percent; corporations
between $500 million and $1 billion saw their
ETRs drop the most, 30.11 percent; corporations
between $1 billion and $5 billion saw an average
ETR drop of 21.4 percent; corporations between
$5 billion and $10 billion experienced a drop of
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91

undervalued by the market, so she does not offer
an explicit conclusion on whether inversions yield
tax benefits.
In a study published in 2013, Eric J. Allen and
Susan C. Morse examine recent initial public
offerings in which the company is listed on an
exchange based in the United States but
95
incorporated outside the United States. Allen
and Morse show that only a small portion of U.S.headquartered companies that engage in IPOs are
incorporated in tax haven countries. They further
show that the recent increase in the number of
U.S.-listed companies incorporated in tax havens
is not attributable to a sharp rise in tax haven
incorporations by U.S.-headquartered companies
but rather is a result of a sharp increase in IPOs by
Chinese-headquartered companies incorporated
96
in tax havens. Allen and Morse show that U.S.headquartered companies account for only a
small portion of the increase, which is the basis for
their conclusion that there is not yet a substantial
exodus of U.S.-headquartered companies away
from incorporation in the United States. However,
the authors do find that those U.S.-headquartered
IPO companies that incorporate in tax havens
have relatively more foreign income than those
that incorporate in the United States. They
interpret that result as suggesting that the
companies that incorporate in tax havens expect
to have larger tax benefits than would other
97
companies from incorporating in a tax haven.
Presumably, if U.S. incorporation was as taxefficient as tax haven incorporation, as Kleinbard
argues, companies with larger foreign earnings
should be no more likely than other companies to
incorporate in tax havens.
In summary, the studies using pre-2004 data
(when naked inversions were possible)
consistently and uniformly showed substantial
declines in global ETRs following inversions, with
the savings likely arising from both U.S. and
foreign markets. Unfortunately, there are only a
few recent studies of the effect of inverting on
corporations’ global ETRs, and the studies that are
available are neither uniform in their conclusions

Id. at 28-29. Both the decrease in ETR on domestic income and
the increase on foreign income are significant.
92

Id. at 52, Table 1.

95

Allen and Morse, “Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S.Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet,” 66 Nat’l Tax J. 396 (2013).

93

Id. at 53, Table 3.

94

Chorvat, “Expectations and Expatriations: A Long-Run Event
Study,” University of Chicago Public Law working paper no. 445
(Sept. 20, 2015).

96
97

Id. at 408-409.
Id. at 409-412.
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percent on domestic income and 27.5 percent on
foreign income. They report an average postinversion ETR of 19.3 percent on domestic income
91
and 39 percent on foreign income.
Gunn and Lys’s results are concerning for
several reasons, which are not explained in their
study. For example, the highest non-U.S. statutory
corporate tax rate in their sample comes from Japan,
92
which is listed as having a 37 percent tax rate, yet
they report that after inverting, companies have an
average ETR of 39 percent on foreign income. Also,
Gunn and Lys report that of their 108 inversion
transactions, U.S. shareholders ended up owning
less than 50 percent of the combined entity’s
93
common stock in 99 of those transactions. In
common parlance, an inversion is a transaction in
which the U.S. shareholders end up owning more
than half of the common stock of the combined
entity. In a foreign acquisition, the shareholders of
the foreign corporation end up with more than half
of the common stock. Thus, the Gunn and Lys study
would not seem to be about inversions, but rather
about foreign acquisitions.
Two other recent studies do not look explicitly
and directly at the impact of inverting on
corporations’ global ETRs but report results that
are broadly consistent with the idea that inverting
companies lower their global ETRs. For example,
a 2015 working paper by Elizabeth Chorvat finds
that post-2004 inversions have produced
economically significant excess returns in the
years following an inversion, although the
announcement of an inversion does not have an
immediate effect on stock prices.94 Chorvat also
finds evidence of a strong correlation between the
excess returns following an inversion and revenue
growth attributable to intangibles held in nonU.S. subsidiaries. However, Chorvat cannot
determine whether that growth is because of tax
savings or whether those assets were
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inversion to see what management said about
expected future tax rates. Although not all
inverting companies publicly stated that they
expected a decline in their global ETRs, many did.
For example, Steris Corp., which also inverted in
2015 and had a global ETR averaging 32.1 percent
for 2011 through 2013, said it expected its global
ETR to be about 25 percent in 2016.104 Also, Pfizer,
whose merger with Allergan was canceled in 2016
after Treasury issued regulations designed to curb
inversions, said it expected the inversion to
reduce its global ETR from roughly 25 percent to
105
about 17 to 18 percent. Similarly, CF Industries
Holdings Inc., which canceled its proposed
merger with Dutch rival OCI after the release of
the 2016 Treasury regulations curbing inversions,
had expected to reduce its global ETR from about
106
35 percent to roughly 20 percent. Also, Applied
Materials, which in 2015 abandoned its proposed
merger with Tokyo Electron,107 had said its deal
108
would have cut its ETR from 22 to 17 percent.
Another company whose management said it
expected to see its global ETR fall after inverting is
Johnson Controls, which is merging with Tyco
(which inverted in 1997). Johnson Control’s
management said it expected the combined
company’s global ETR to be 18 or 19 percent. Since
Tyco paid 12 percent of its income in taxes over
the last three years, whereas Johnson Controls
paid 29 percent over that period,109 the expected
global ETR of 18 or 19 percent would represent a
10 percent drop for Johnson Controls. Further,
Waste Connections Inc. said it expects its
inversion to reduce its global ETR from 40 percent

104

Pittsburgh Post Gazette, Feb. 13, 2015, at 2, section C.

105

Chad Bray, “Pfizer to Merge With Allergan in $160 Billion
Deal,” The New York Times, Nov. 23, 2015; Denise Roland, “Is
Pfizer’s Deal Good for Ireland?” The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25,
2015, at 2, section B.
106

CF Industries Holdings Inc. at Morgan Stanley Global
Chemicals Conference — Final FD (Fair Disclosure) Wire (Nov. 9,
2015).
107

98

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056-1060.

99

Patty Tascarala, “Mylan Inversion Deal Completed,”
Pittsburgh Business Times, Feb. 27, 2015.
100

More recently, Bresch has been in the news for the sharp
increase in the price of the EpiPen and Bresch’s compensation
package.
101
102
103

See Sorkin, supra note 14.
Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1060 n.14.
Id. at 1060.

Brent Kendall and Don Clark, “Applied Materials, Tokyo
Electron Cancel Merger Plan; Deal Collapses After Firms Give Up
on Winning Antitrust Approval,” The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 27,
2015.
108

Financial Times (London), Sept. 8, 2014, at 17.

109

Bob Tita and Dana Mattioli, “Tyco, Johnson Controls Bet
Bigger Is Better — Merger Reflects a Growing Push Toward
Companies That Are Larger, More Focused,” The Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 26, 2016, at 1, section B. However, Johnson Controls’
tax rate before specific items was 19 percent over the prior two
years.
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nor entirely convincing on the impact of inverting
on a company’s global ETR. Even so, the recent
studies suggest (and are generally consistent
with) the notion that many U.S.-domiciled
companies lower their global ETRs by inverting.
This would seem to be an area ripe for more work.
Another approach to the question of the
expected effect of inverting on an MNC’s global
ETR is to see what the management of an
inverting company publicly say they expect to
happen to their firm’s global ETR after inverting.
Thus, Kleinbard begins his article by giving the
example of Mylan,98 which inverted by acquiring
99
Abbot Laboratories, a Netherlands corporation.
In 2014 Heather Bresch, the CEO of Mylan,100
described herself as “reluctantly” inverting but
having to do so because Mylan’s global tax rate was
too high relative to its competitors, and Bresch had
given up hope that Congress would reform the tax
law to make U.S.-domiciled corporations more
101
competitive. As Bresch describes it, by inverting,
Mylan would reduce its global ETR from “about 25
102
percent,” to around 20 percent in the year
following the inversion and then into the high teens
in following years. She offered that reduction in
Mylan’s expected global ETR as the reason why the
company was inverting. However, as Kleinbard
points out, Mylan’s tax rate before inverting was not
“about 25 percent,” but substantially lower. Mylan’s
global ETR was 16.2 percent in 2013, 20 percent in
2012, and 17.7 percent in 2011, according to
103
Kleinbard. Thus, despite Bresch’s claim that the
inversion would reduce Mylan’s global ETR, the
inversion (assuming that the company’s global ETR
after inverting would be as Bresch predicted) would
essentially leave Mylan’s global ETR unchanged.
To determine whether the management of
inverting companies expect to see a decline in
their global ETRs, I looked at the inversion
transactions announced since Mylan’s 2015
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110

Scott Deveau et al., “Texas Trash Hauler Seeks Move to
Canada in Inversion Deal,” DTR (Jan. 21, 2016).
111

Leslie Picker, “A Merger in Data and Analytics: All-Stock
Deal Will Create Company With Annual Revenue of $3.3 Billion,”
International New York Times, Mar. 23, 2016.
112

E.g., John Carney, “Sparing Burger King Some Taxes,” The
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 27, 2014, at C14; and Zachary R. Mider,
“Burger King Saying Move Won’t Save Taxes Draws Criticism,”
Bloomberg Business, Sept. 3, 2014. Interestingly, Tim Hortons
inverted to Canada in 2009 and gave as one reason the opportunity
“to take advantage of lower Canadian tax rates.” Id.
113

One might be skeptical of managers’ statements about what
they expect the effect of an inversion to be on their companies’
ETRs. Although there is likely some flexibility (after all, there is a
long history of earnings management), there is also a risk to the
managers from dissembling. Managers who knowingly make
misleading statements can face civil and criminal liability under
the federal securities law. See generally Amanda Athanasiou, “Eaton
Corp. Sued Over Statements About Post-Inversion Spinoff,” Tax
Notes, Aug. 1, 2016, p. 663. There is likely little legal risk from being
wrong about your prior global ETRs, because those numbers are
public and available.

based MNCs expect to improve their competitive
position (as measured by their global ETRs) by
inverting.
In summary, although simple comparisons of
average global ETRs of U.S.- and non-U.S.domiciled MNCs might suggest that U.S. MNCs
cannot reduce their global ETRs by inverting
because the average global ETRs of U.S.domiciled MNCs are roughly as high as the
average global ETRs of non-U.S.-domiciled
MNCs, more extensive and fine-grained data
suggest the opposite. U.S.-domiciled MNCs have
higher global ETRs than MNCs domiciled in most
other market-oriented countries. Also, many U.S.domiciled MNCs in the pharmaceuticals industry,
an industry that has experienced many highly
publicized inversions, have higher global ETRs
than their foreign-domiciled rivals. Further,
studies that looked at pre-2004 inversions, when
naked inversions were still possible, consistently
found substantial declines in global ETRs from
inverting. Although the small number of post2004 studies of the impact of inverting on global
ETRs are not as uniform nor as persuasive as
earlier studies, taken together those studies
suggest that many companies see their global
ETRs fall when they invert. That view is further
supported by corporate inversion
announcements, which often indicate that the
management of inverting U.S. MNCs expect to see
their global ETRs fall. Thus, viewed through the
lens of corporations’ global ETRs, Kleinbard’s
claim that inverting U.S.-domiciled companies do
not improve their competitive position by
inverting is not supported by the data and is
inconsistent with most studies.
2. Market-specific ETRs.
It is easy to understand why commentators
debating whether the U.S. tax system
disadvantages U.S.-based MNCs relative to their
foreign rivals frequently take refuge in global
ETRs. That approach relies on readily available
data (public companies report global ETRs in
their public financial statements) and thus allows
scholars, analysts, and commentators to compare
global ETRs across rivals from different
jurisdictions and look at what happens over time
to global ETRs. However, that approach buries all
the hard questions about how U.S. companies and
their foreign rivals are taxed by subsuming those
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to 27 percent. Similarly, Baxalta, which is
merging with Ireland’s Shire, expects the
combined company to have a global ETR of 16 to
17 percent, a substantial decline from Baxalta’s
current rate of 23 to 24 percent. Thus, according to
public statements, the managers of many
inverting corporations expect to see their
companies’ ETRs fall.
However, not all managers of inverting firms
publicly stated that they expect to see their
companies’ global ETRs fall after inverting. In at
least two inversions, management said it expected
little change in ETR following the transaction. For
example, IHS, which merged with the U.K.’s
Markit, reported a global ETR of 20.54 percent for
2015. According to a statement from IHS, “IHS’s
tax rate might not change much” after the
111
merger. Another inversion transaction in which
management said it did not expect a change in tax
rates to occur was the 2014 Burger King-Tim
Hortons merger. However, some observers
expected Burger King’s global ETR to fall after the
inversion and believed that there were substantial
112
tax benefits from the shift in corporate domicile.
In some cases, it can be difficult to tell what
impact management expects an inversion to have
on its global ETR because management declines to
say or because pre-inversion ETRs have been
volatile. Nonetheless, although not all inverting
companies report that they expect to see their
113
global ETRs fall, based on managers’ inversion
announcements, it would appear that many U.S.-
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Robinson is also skeptical of using simple comparisons of
global ETRs to determine whether MNCs domiciled in one country
are more competitive than those domiciled in another country.
According to Robinson, a more reasonable method to make those
determinations is by comparing ETRs within a single jurisdiction
operated by MNCs domiciled in different jurisdictions, which we
have not been able to do. Robinson, supra note 26, at 2-3.

argument, which is as follows: Because U.S.
companies typically have a larger share of their
operations in the United States than do their
foreign rivals where tax rates are highest,
presumably — as a simple matter of arithmetic —
it follows that U.S. companies have lower ETRs on
115
foreign-source income than their foreign rivals.
As for offering a substantive argument to the
effect that U.S.-domiciled MNCs have low or
lower market-specific tax rates than their foreign
rivals, the above arithmetic argument is it.
Kleinbard also supports his claim that U.S.
MNCs do not face a financial accounting
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals by
quoting from Leslie Robinson’s 2014
congressional testimony to the effect that the
financial accounting literature does not show that
116
U.S. MNCs are at a tax disadvantage :
Leslie Robinson of Dartmouth’s Tuck
School of Business recently summarized
the academic and financial accounting
literature in testimony before the Senate
Finance Committee as establishing that
“there is no evidence that U.S. MNCs face
greater tax burdens as a consequence of
how foreign profits are taxed, relative to
117
their competitors.”
Starting with Kleinbard’s substantive
argument, whatever the merits of the arithmetic
for the general proposition — that U.S. MNCs
have higher ETRs on average than non-U.S.
MNCs — such a general argument seems to be a
flimsy foundation on which to ground a

115

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1059. Kleinbard illustrates his
argument with a hypothetical example of a U.S. MNC and a
foreign MNC that both pay tax at an overall effective rate of 25
percent. The U.S. company earns 60 percent of its income from the
United States, whereas the foreign company earns 40 percent from
the United States, with both companies effectively taxed at 35
percent on that income. According to Kleinbard, those assumptions
imply that the U.S. MNC has an ETR of 10 percent on its non-U.S.source income, whereas the foreign company has an ETR of 18.3
percent. He concludes that the U.S. company “completely
dominates” the foreign company “along the standard
‘competitiveness’ yardstick.” Id. at 1059. Of course, the calculated
ETRs on non-U.S.-source income are derived from simple algebra,
and the U.S. MNC has a lower ETR on non-U.S.-source income
because it earns proportionally more income in the United States,
which is the high-tax jurisdiction, and the companies’ overall ETRs
are the same. Kleinbard backs up his argument with an example,
Mylan, which he introduces with the phrase, “This example is not
entirely fanciful.” Id. at 1059-1060.
116

Robinson, supra note 26, at 2.

117

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1057-1058 (quoting Robinson,
supra note 26, at 2).
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questions under a single, widely available
number — the global ETR. But the main problem
with that approach is that it is unclear why
multinational companies, especially MNCs
operating in countries with very different tax
systems and tax rates, should make capital
budgeting decisions in individual markets using
global ETRs. Even assuming the managers of
MNCs focused exclusively on reported
accounting earnings in making business and
investment decisions, as Kleinbard sometimes
argues, it makes no sense for those companies to
make investment decisions using their global
ETRs.
Instead, it makes more sense for companies
whose managers are focused exclusively on
accounting earnings to make investment
decisions using whatever accounting tax rates
their managers expect their companies to incur on
the earnings generated by those investments.
Thus, only if a project was expected to produce
the same geographic distribution of earnings as
the company’s current projects produce should
the managers use the company’s global ETR.
Assuming the earnings from a project were
expected to have a different distribution than the
earnings of the company in general, managers of
an MNC focused exclusively on after-tax earnings
should use a tax rate that reflected the distribution
of the expected earnings. In the special case, in
which the earnings from an investment were
expected to be taxed in only one jurisdiction, the
managers should use the company’s ETR from
that jurisdiction. Hence, Kleinbard’s more
sophisticated financial accounting argument is
that U.S.-based MNCs are not at a tax-induced
competitive advantage relative to foreign rivals
because their market-specific ETRs are no higher
114
than those of their foreign rivals.
Kleinbard’s argument begins by noting that
U.S. companies often report global ETRs as low as
their foreign rivals. That premise then
immediately leads to the heart of Kleinbard’s
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comparisons nor any references to any studies
comparing overall (global) ETRs of U.S.-based
and foreign-based MNCs in specific national
markets.
Although he does not provide evidence or
refer to any studies, Kleinbard quotes and cites
Robinson’s testimony that “there is no evidence
that U.S. MNCs face greater tax burdens as a
consequence of how foreign profits are taxed,
relative to their competitors.”119 Kleinbard
presents Robinson’s testimony as offering an
affirmative conclusion: U.S. MNCs do not suffer a
tax-induced disadvantage as compared with their
foreign rivals. Robinson, however, offers only a
negative conclusion — that there is insufficient
evidence in the financial accounting literature to
establish a conclusion one way or the other. Thus,
to the quote above, Robinson adds, “Researchers
cannot make comparisons by jurisdictions that
would seem necessary to resolve the
120
competitiveness issue.” Indeed, Robinson
explicitly rejects Kleinbard’s method of trying to
derive companies’ market-specific ETRs from
their global ETRs:
Comparing global ETRs will not detect
violations of capital import neutrality
because they, in part, reflect differences in
location decisions.
Since each MNC has a different geographic
footprint, a comparison of ETRs within a
single jurisdiction operated by MNCs
resident in different countries would seem
more appropriate. For instance, how does
the tax burden (including both source and
host country taxes) on operations in a given
country compare between U.S. MNCs and
non-U.S. MNCs? We do not know the
answer to this question, nor is there good
data to answer it. At best, we observe the
source country tax, but do not observe any
home country tax imposed on profits earned
in a specific country.121

119

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1057-1058 (quoting Robinson,
supra note 26, at 2).
120

Robinson, supra note 26, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).

118

Robinson, supra note 26, at 2-3.

121

Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
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conclusion that U.S.-based MNCs have as high or
higher ETRs in specific non-U.S. markets than
their foreign rivals. Kleinbard also fails to
establish the premises on which his mathematical
argument rests. As the last section describes, the
premise that U.S.-based MNCs have as low or
lower companywide ETRs than their competitors
is questionable. The premise that ETRs for both
U.S. and non-U.S. companies are higher in the
United States than they are in other jurisdictions
seems reasonable, as does the premise that U.S.
MNCs have proportionally larger footprints in
the United States than do their rivals. However,
the claim that U.S. MNCs and their foreign rivals
have similar geographic footprints outside the
United States is not supported and is highly
questionable.118
Further, there is other evidence that calls into
question Kleinbard’s claim that U.S. MNCs have
jurisdiction-specific ETRs as high as their rivals.
The tendency for inversions to lower global ETRs
implies that jurisdiction-specific ETRs are
lowered somewhat after an inversion. Assuming
then that MNCs make business and investment
decisions using jurisdiction-specific ETRs, the
evidence discussed in the last section showing
that inversions tend to lower global ETRs
suggests at the very least that inverting MNCs
have lower jurisdiction-specific ETRs in some
jurisdictions, although we do not know which
ones. A reduction in jurisdiction-specific tax rates
will improve the competitiveness of inverting
companies in at least one jurisdiction (assuming
that companies use market-specific ETRs to make
investment decisions). Thus, Kleinbard’s indirect
method of establishing that U.S.-domiciled MNCs
have as low or lower ETRs than their foreign
rivals in specific markets comes up short. But that
is not the same as saying he is wrong.
To establish — or refute — Kleinbard’s claim
that U.S.-based MNCs have as low or lower ETRs
in foreign markets than do their non-U.S. rivals
calls for direct comparisons in specific markets.
We would like to be able to compare the ETRs in
specific markets of U.S.-based and non-U.S.-based
MNCs that compete with one another.
Unfortunately, however, Kleinbard provides no
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B. The Cash Flow Claim
Kleinbard not only argues that U.S.-domiciled
MNCs are not at a tax-induced competitive
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals based
on financial accounting conceptions of tax
burdens, he further argues that U.S. MNCs are not
at a disadvantage based on cash flow taxes. I now
examine that claim.
Modern finance theory teaches that business
and investment (sometimes called capital
budgeting) decisions should be made on the basis
of net present value (NPV) using after-tax cash
flows, not financial accounting concepts. The
NPV rule is to accept all investments with a
positive NPV and to reject all investments with a
negative NPV. The NPV of a project is the

122
123

Id. at 2-3.

In July 2016 two researchers from Vienna University of
Economics and Business, Saskia Kohlhase and Jochen Pierk, posted
a paper on SSRN, the title of which suggests that they answered
whether foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs pay higher or lower
taxes than their non-U.S. rivals in specific markets. Kohlhase and
Pierk, “Why Are U.S.-Owned Foreign Subsidiaries Not Tax
Aggressive?” WU International Taxation research paper series no.
2016-03 (July 2016). The authors consistently find that subsidiaries
of U.S. MNCs have higher national ETRs than do subsidiaries of
MNCs from countries with territorial tax systems in various
European countries. However, because Kohlhase and Pierk use
unconsolidated financial statements of European subsidiaries
owned by foreign MNCs for 2005 through 2009, a period the
authors say during which Germany had a close alignment between
book and tax income, the authors’ research design allows them to
identify tax planning that reduces taxes but does not reduce
income, such as locating production facilities in subnational states
with low taxes. Unfortunately, their design does not allow them to
identify income shifting through related-party debt, royalties, and
aggressive transfer pricing, because that shifting reduces both taxes
and income. Of course, it is such income shifting, which Kleinbard
has labeled “stateless income,” that is at the heart of the debate
over MNCs’ ETRs in specific markets.

discounted value of the expected future net aftertax cash flows from that project. The discount rate
is the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for
the project, which can differ from that of the
company. The WACC is the before-tax cost of the
incremental equity and the after-tax cost of the
incremental debt that supports the project. Thus,
the tax rate appears in both the numerator and the
denominator. According to modern finance
theory, the relevant tax rate is the marginal cash
tax rate (often referred to simply as the MTR).
That tax rate is neither an average tax rate nor a
financial accounting concept. Instead, the MTR of
a project is the present value of the incremental
taxes to be paid if the project is undertaken,
divided by the present value of the project’s net
cash flow. That tax rate reflects both when that
cash flow is taxed and the rate at which it is taxed.
Once again, Kleinbard’s claim that
competitiveness arguments are baseless is a claim
that U.S.-domiciled MNCs incur no costs because of
the United States’ worldwide tax system with
deferral. That no-cost claim implies that U.S.
companies pay no U.S. tax on their overseas
earnings and incur no costs from deferring or
avoiding U.S. taxation. Thus, the no-cost claim
implies the following: (1) U.S. companies pay no
explicit tax costs from repatriating cash to the
United States; (2) U.S. companies pay no explicit tax
costs from keeping cash abroad; (3) U.S. companies
incur no explicit nontax costs from holding cash
abroad; and (4) U.S. companies incur no implicit
124
nontax costs from holding cash overseas.
In contrast with Kleinbard’s claim, there is
good reason to believe that unconstrained U.S.domiciled MNCs (that is, companies that do not
need to repatriate overseas cash to fund U.S.
investment) incur all four types of costs. First,
some unconstrained companies do incur the

124

As Kleinbard recognizes, U.S.-domiciled companies that are
capital constrained and thus need to repatriate foreign earnings to
undertake profitable U.S. investments are taxed at full statutory
rates on their overseas income. Those companies are at a tax
disadvantage relative to their foreign rivals by virtue of the U.S.
worldwide tax system, even though that system provides for the
possibility of deferral. Those companies cannot defer repatriation
indefinitely because they need access to their overseas cash to
make domestic investments, so the U.S. worldwide tax puts them
at a competitive disadvantage. Although there are circumstances in
which it might be difficult to determine whether a company is
capital constrained, Kleinbard focuses on companies that are not
capital constrained and thus do not need to repatriate foreign
earnings in order to make profitable U.S. investments.
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As Robinson makes clear, we simply do not
know what MNCs’ ETRs are in specific markets,
much less how they differ based on where the
company is based. I am unaware of any such
studies, and Robinson flatly says that as of
122
summer 2014, there were none available.
Without any studies to rely on, any conclusion is
shaky. The claim that U.S.-domiciled MNCs have
jurisdiction-specific ETRs as high as their
123
competitors is merely conjecture. Thus, on the
more sophisticated version of Kleinbard’s
financial accounting claim, we currently lack the
data to make an informed judgment whether
inversions lower market-specific ETRs in
specified identified markets.
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125

Greg Bensinger, “EBay to Take $3 Billion Tax Charge,” The
Wall Street Journal, Apr. 29, 2014 (eBay announced that it was
repatriating $9 billion, most of its overseas cash, at an expected tax
cost of $3 billion); Vipal Monga, “GE Jumps on the Repatriation
Bandwagon,” The Wall Street Journal, Apr 10, 2015 (GE announced
that it will repatriate $36 billion of $61 billion held overseas and
pay $6 billion in taxes; the funds are to be used to help pay for
dividends, share repurchases, and a share exchange from spinning
off its private-label credit card business).

Second, there is an explicit U.S. tax cost from
holding cash balances in non-U.S. subsidiaries.
The interest on those cash balances is subject to
current U.S. taxation whether it is repatriated or
held abroad in accordance with the current U.S.
128
antiabuse regime. Thus, on their foreign cash
balances, U.S. MNCs earn only the aftercorporate-tax rate of return, not the beforecorporate-tax rate of return. In contrast, if the
income were repatriated and distributed to
shareholders (without corporate tax), the
shareholders could invest the cash without being
subject to further corporate taxation. The
corporate tax paid on U.S. MNCs’ overseas
interest earnings is an explicit tax cost from
129
holding cash overseas.
In recent years, some U.S.-domiciled MNCs
with large overseas cash balances have borrowed
large sums of money and used those proceeds to
pay dividends, repurchase shares, or invest in
domestic operations. The best-known example is
130
Apple, which has borrowed roughly $75 billion.
Because Apple can deduct its interest payments
from its income, the interest the company pays on
its $75 billion in debt roughly offsets the interest it
earns on $75 billion of its overseas cash holdings.
Apple’s offset, however, is incomplete.
Congress long ago recognized that the U.S. tax
law encourages U.S.-domiciled MNCs to borrow
in the United States rather than abroad in order to
reduce their U.S. taxable income without
reducing their overall global income.
Accordingly, U.S.-domiciled companies are
required to apportion their borrowings between
131
U.S. and foreign income. As a result, not all
interest paid on Apple’s $75 billion of debt is
deductible in the United States. Some of that
interest is apportioned to foreign income and will
generate a tax benefit only when foreign earnings
are repatriated.

126

Melissa Redmiles, “One-Time Received Dividend
Deduction,” 27 SOI Bull. 103 (2008).
127

The economic literature on the repatriation holiday focuses
on how the repatriated funds were used. See, e.g., Thomas J.
Brennan, “Where the Money Went: A New Understanding of the
ACJA Tax Holiday,” working paper (Mar. 6, 2014); Brennan, “What
Happens After a Holiday? Long-Term Effects of the Repatriation
Provision of the AJCA,” 5 Nw. JL. & Soc. Pol’y 1 (2010); Jennifer L
Blouin and Linda K. Krull, “Bringing It Home: A Study of the
Incentives Surrounding the Repatriation of Foreign Earnings
Under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,” 47 J. Acct Res. 1027
(2009); and Dhammika Dhamapala, C. Fritz Foley, and Kristin J.
Forbes, “Watch What I Do, Not What I Say: The Unintended
Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act,” 66 J. Fin. 753
(2011).

128

Sections 951(a), 952(a)(2), and 954(c)(1)(A).

129

The tax cost of earning interest on cash held offshore varies
directly with interest rates.
130

Apple’s balance sheet as of September 24, 2016, available on
Yahoo Finance (long-term debt of $75 billion); Tim Higgins, “Tim
Cook’s $181b Headache,” Bloomberg, July 22, 2015.
131

Section 864(e).
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explicit tax cost of repatriation at the statutory
rate. Despite the potentially large U.S. tax bite,
some companies repatriate earnings, which
exposes them to the potential 35 percent U.S.
corporate tax rate. Unconstrained major
corporations with large cash holdings that have
repatriated earnings in recent years include eBay
and GE.125 If it were costless to hold untaxed
earnings overseas, companies that were not
capital constrained would presumably never
repatriate and never pay U.S. tax on their offshore
earnings.
Further, the 2004-2005 tax holiday that
reduced the maximum repatriation tax rate from
35 percent to 5.25 percent saw 843 U.S. MNCs
repatriate in aggregate $362 billion (of which $312
billion was subject to the reduced holiday tax
126
rate). Such large and widespread repatriations
are inconsistent with the notion that it is costless
for U.S. MNCs to maintain foreign cash balances
that would be subject to taxation upon
repatriation. If it were costless for companies to
keep repatriated earnings overseas, presumably
they would have forgone repatriation during the
127
holiday.
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companies that borrow to access that cash,
because the arbitrage is imperfect, find their credit
rating downgraded and hence their interest
135
expense increased.
Fourth, there is also evidence that U.S.domiciled MNCs that hold large amounts of
offshore earnings incur implicit nontax costs to
avoid paying tax upon repatriation, including tax
136
planning and structuring costs. Harry Grubert
and Rosanne Altshuler estimated the implicit
costs of accumulating deferrals using data from
137
the 2004-2005 repatriation tax holiday. They
concluded that “the marginal cost of deferral is
very low immediately after the tax holiday
repatriations, but after 10 years, that is, by 2015, it
rises to about 7 percentage points.”138 Grubert and
Altshuler further concluded that the implicit costs
of deferring repatriations increase with the size of
the cash balances.139
Another indication of the cost to companies of
holding cash overseas is the effort and expense
U.S.-based MNCs undertake in order to invert.
Any sizeable merger and acquisition is expensive,
but inversions are especially expensive. Price
premiums — the excess of the merger price over
the market price of the target before the
transaction is announced — are often higher for
inversion transactions than for other
140
transactions. Also, inverting companies are
frequently downgraded by the credit reporting
agencies, which results in higher borrowing costs,
141
further increasing the cost of inverting.
The discussion above looks only at the current
costs of holding cash overseas. Although it can be
difficult to make reliable estimates, capital
budgeting is a forward-looking exercise. The NPV
rule does not use current cash flows, but rather

135

Robinson, supra note 26. See also Standard and Poor’s Rating
Services, “Ratings Direct Draft: Inversions Lower Tax Liabilities,
But Also Can Impair Credit Ratings,” Sept. 8, 2014 (noting that
inverted companies are frequently downgraded because of their
increased use of debt).
136

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1057.

132

137

Higgins, supra note 130.

133

Apple could, of course, use U.S. funds to pay off the debt
without incurring repatriation taxes, but that assumes Apple has
excess U.S. funds. That is uncertain, whereas the excess foreign
funds are present.
134

Foley et al., “Why Do Firms Hold So Much Cash? A TaxBased Explanation,” 86 J. Fin. Econ. 579 (2007); Hanlon et al., “The
Effect of Repatriation Tax Costs on U.S. Multinationals,” 116 J. Fin.
Econ. 179 (2015).

Grubert and Altshuler, “Fixing the System: An Analysis of
Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax,” 66 Nat’l
Tax J. 671 (2013).
138

Id. at 685.

139

Id. at 683.

140

Athananasiou, “Inversion Premiums Deconstructed,” Tax
Notes, Sept. 8, 2014, p. 116.
141

S&P, supra note 135.
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Moreover, Apple’s offset is incomplete
because the company holds more cash overseas
than it has debt outstanding. Apple holds $180
132
billion in overseas cash, not $75 billion. The
company thus holds $105 billion in cash in its
foreign subsidiaries, against which it has not
borrowed. Accordingly, Apple is paying tax on
the interest generated by its $105 billion of
overseas cash not offset by domestic borrowings,
so the company incurs an explicit tax cost from
holding that cash. That, in turn, presumably
means that the cash Apple holds abroad is less
valuable to the company (as a U.S.-domiciled
corporation) than it would be to a foreigndomiciled corporation, which could repatriate
and distribute the proceeds to shareholders
without incurring home-country tax.
Also, although Apple’s $75 billion of
borrowing is typically referred to as “arbitrage,” it
is an imperfect form of arbitrage. That is because
the offsetting transactions are incomplete and
risky. Traditional arbitrage transactions provide a
profit without risk and can be unwound without
cost (other than transaction costs). Unlike
traditional arbitrage, Apple’s arbitrage is
incomplete because the company cannot deduct
all of the interest it pays on its debt. Moreover,
because Apple cannot unwind the transaction
costlessly, its arbitrage is risky. If at some point
Apple decides it wants to close out the arbitrage,
it must pay off its offsetting U.S. debt. However,
Apple cannot pay off its U.S. debt using its
overseas funds without also paying tax upon
133
repatriation. The risk inherent in the arbitrage is
underscored by Apple borrowing against only
two-fifths of its offshore cash.
Third, there are explicit nontax costs from
holding cash overseas. There is a widespread
view that overseas cash holdings that would be
subject to tax upon repatriation are valued by the
134
market at less than their face value. And
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142

Stephanie Soong Johnston, “Lew Says EU State Aid Issue
Could Lead to ‘Perfect Storm’ for Tax Reform” (Oct. 7, 2016).
143

Trump tax reform (deemed repatriation of corporate profits
at a one-time tax rate of 10 percent); David Dayen, “The Huge
Corporate Tax Cut Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Talk About,” New
Republic, Oct. 21, 2016 (in the first presidential debate, Clinton
followed Trump’s endorsement of a 10 percent tax on foreign
earnings, saying “I happen to support that in a way that will
actually work to our benefit.”).
144

There is an uncomfortable tension between Kleinbard’s
support (on one hand) of proposals that would end deferral and
make it more difficult for U.S. MNCs to escape from the U.S.
worldwide tax system (e.g., Americans for Tax Fairness, supra note
23, at 3) and his insistence (on the other hand) that U.S. MNCs are
not at a competitive disadvantage because they are taxed no more
heavily than their non-U.S. rivals. The tension arises because even
if Kleinbard is correct that at the current time and on a cash basis,
U.S. MNCs face taxes no higher than those faced by their foreign
rivals, capital budgeting is a forward-looking exercise in which
taxpayers make investment decisions today by estimating expected
future cash flows, including expected future taxes. Thus, even if the
current “ersatz territorial tax system” is effectively equivalent to (or
even less burdensome than) actual territorial systems, a shift in the
U.S. tax system toward a system that more closely resembles a
traditional worldwide tax system (such as taxing overseas income
at a minimum rate without deferral) would reduce returns on
investments made by U.S. MNCs, thereby hampering their
competitiveness. For example, if the United States were to tax the
foreign income of U.S. MNCs without deferral at the statutory rate,
U.S. MNCs would clearly be disadvantaged relative to their nonU.S. rivals, and thus there would be a clear forward-looking benefit
to inverting: Inverting companies would escape the taxes the
United States would impose on U.S.-domiciled MNCs’ overseas
income.

campaign, Clinton released a detailed proposal
designed to stop inversions.145 Her proposal called
for raising to 50 percent the foreign ownership
threshold for a merger to change the legal
domicile of the parent corporation. Clinton also
proposed an exit tax on the untaxed overseas
profits of U.S. companies acquired by foreign
corporations.146 Without being specific, Trump
repeatedly said during the campaign that he
147
would stop inversions.
The significance of all this for Kleinbard’s cash
flow claim is that a U.S. MNC looking at the current
tax situation and anticipating what is likely to
happen should have no problem finding a
competitiveness rationale rooted in U.S. taxation for
inverting. Even if the company’s managers agreed
with Kleinbard that their company is not currently
disadvantaged relative to its non-U.S. rivals given
the current tax laws, they might still reasonably
conclude that there is a plausible chance that future
tax reforms (such as the elimination of deferral)
would make them worse off than their non-U.S.
competitors. Also, calls to tighten the anti-inversion
rules even more — such as by requiring that the
foreign merger partner be larger than the U.S.
partner in order for the transaction to be respected
as shifting domicile — are further encouraging U.S.
148
companies to invert.
The above analysis looks to the future. If we
step back several years and look forward with the
benefit of hindsight, we see a similar pattern. In
recent years, the United States has enacted
policies designed to raise the tax on income held
offshore (such as the anti-hopscotch rules in the
April 2016 notice) and other policies that make it
more difficult for companies to invert (through a
series of changes adopted beginning in 2004).
Most recently, Treasury finalized regulations
under section 385 that target inverting companies
but make it more difficult for all companies to
strip earnings out from the United States by

145

Clinton Factsheets: “Ending Inversions and Investing in
America.” See Mindy Herzfeld, “Clinton’s Exit Tax and a Broader
Business Tax Reform Agenda,” Tax Notes, Aug. 29, 2016, p. 1195.
146

Thus, Clinton’s proposal would seem to call for imposing an
exit tax on the unrepatriated earnings of U.S. MNCs that are
acquired by foreign companies. Herzfeld, supra note 145, at 1196.
147

Jared Meyer, “More Economic Nonsense From Trump,”
National Review, Feb. 15, 2016.
148

Clinton Factsheets, supra note 145; Herzfeld, supra note 145.
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expected future cash flows. And there are good
reasons to believe for U.S.-domiciled MNCs, the
explicit and implicit costs of earning overseas
income and holding cash abroad will increase —
or at least that the managers of those companies
might conclude that there is a nontrivial
possibility of such an increase.
For example, in addition to the steps Treasury
has taken to curb inversions, the Obama
administration proposed a 19 percent minimum tax
on U.S.-domiciled MNCs’ overseas income without
deferral, and Jacob Lew, Obama’s Treasury
secretary, claimed in late 2016 that there was
142
bipartisan support in Congress for such a tax.
Further, President Trump as well as his Democratic
opponent in the general election, Hillary Clinton,
have both endorsed a minimum tax on U.S. MNCs’
143
foreign income. A minimum tax would raise taxes
on overseas income of U.S.-domiciled MNCs,
thereby weakening the competitiveness of U.S.
144
MNCs relative to their foreign rivals.
Moreover, managers of U.S.-domiciled MNCs
might reasonably believe that it will become even
more difficult for U.S. MNCs to invert and escape
worldwide taxation. During the presidential
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are at a tax disadvantage relative to their foreign
rivals, because Kleinbard still has one possible
escape hatch.
As Kleinbard argues, non-U.S.-domiciled
MNCs can face a higher tax burden than do U.S.domiciled MNCs on income earned outside the
parent corporation’s state of domicile. The idea is
that non-U.S.-domiciled MNCs are subject to
stricter antiabuse rules in their home country
(despite being domiciled in nominally territorial
states) on foreign-source income (and on
domestic income shifted abroad) than are U.S.domiciled MNCs (domiciled in an ostensibly
worldwide state), so the non-U.S.-domiciled
MNCs actually face higher taxes than U.S.domiciled MNCs.
Antiabuse rules typically apply to
corporations domiciled in a state, and they tax at
the corporation’s marginal rate the income of
CFCs that is shifted or seen as problematic. Thus,
although the United States has one of the highest
statutory corporate tax rates among OECD
countries, Kleinbard suggests that U.S. antiabuse
rules are more porous and capture sufficiently
less income than those of other countries,
rendering the U.S. antiabuse rules less
149
burdensome.
Kleinbard makes that argument several times
in his 2014 article, beginning on the second page,
where he describes the environment in which U.S.
MNCs operate as an “ersatz territorial
environment, without any of the anti-abuse rules
that a thoughtful territorial tax system would
150
impose” (emphasis added). And in the next
paragraph, he argues that it is relatively easy for
U.S. companies to aggressively move income
from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions because
they are “unencumbered by any of the anti-abuse
rules to which non-U.S. multinationals domiciled
in jurisdictions with better designed territorial
151
systems might be subject” (emphasis added).
The tentative language is revealing. Not only are
the statements not supported by data or

149

A similar sentiment is expressed in the letter signed by 24 tax
experts. Americans for Tax Fairness, supra note 23, at 2 (“U.S.
multinationals are unquestionably the world’s leaders in global taxavoidance strategies.”).
150

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1056.

151

Id.

644

TAX NOTES, MAY 1, 2017
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

issuing new debt. The regulations thus give
existing internal debt-intensive capital structures
a big advantage over new structures. Companies
that completed their inversions before April 2016,
the relevant date under the regulations, have a
significant edge over companies that would invert
after that date.
Thus, whether using hindsight to look from
the past to today, or looking forward from today
into an uncertain future, there are strong,
competitiveness-rooted reasons for U.S.
companies to invert. Strong reasons, however, are
not the same as certainty. The surprise election of
Trump, whose embrace of mercantilist language
calls into question long-standing policies and
practices, underscores the difficulty in making
definitive statements about whether U.S.domiciled MNCs can expect to raise or lower their
MTRs by inverting. That uncertainty, however,
does not support Kleinbard’s claim that
competitiveness has nothing to do with
inversions. Uncertainty can be a reason to invert
rather than delay doing so. An inverted company
can presumably reverse its decision and
reestablish U.S. domicile; however, a company
that has not inverted might find inverting more
difficult in the future.
Further, when we avoid trying to predict how
tax (and other policies) will evolve in the future
(which is part of a complete discounted cash flow
analysis) and just focus on the simpler and
narrower questions at the heart of Kleinbard’s
cash flow claim — that the U.S. worldwide tax
system imposes on U.S.-domiciled MNCs no costs
of earning foreign income — we see that for the
reasons given above, a U.S. MNC’s expected
marginal tax cost of earning income overseas will
very likely be positive, although the magnitude of
that cost is uncertain. The alternative hypothesis,
that the cost is zero, seems unlikely in light of the
above and has certainly not been established. Yet
that is the position Kleinbard not only endorses
but claims is supported by the evidence.
Although the above arguments are detrimental to
Kleinbard’s claim that the U.S. tax system is an
“ersatz territorial” tax system (that is, that there is
no tax cost on overseas earnings), they are not
dispositive of the broader claim that U.S. MNCs
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Id. at 1067. Note the shift from arguing that the U.S. tax
system does not disadvantage U.S. MNCs to arguing that the
converse claim — that U.S. MNCs are at a tax disadvantage — has
not been established.

Moreover, there is good reason to believe that
EU corporations are not tightly constrained by
antiabuse regimes. In 2006 the Court of Justice of
the European Union issued a decision that
severely restricts the ability of EU member states
to enact CFC rules that might otherwise restrain
widespread shifting of income to low-tax
jurisdictions within the EU. In its Cadbury154
Schweppes decision, the CJEU held that the
United Kingdom’s CFC rules violated freedom of
establishment rights under the EU treaties
because those rules were not limited “to wholly
artificial arrangements.” In 2010, in light of the
CJEU’s Cadbury decision, the European Council
recommended that member states include an
exception clause in their antiabuse regimes
restricting their reach within the EU to only
wholly artificial arrangements. Most EU member
states have complied, substantially weakening
antiabuse rules within the EU regarding income
that is taxed in a member state. With low
corporate tax rates in Luxembourg and Ireland,
EU-domiciled MNCs have significant
opportunities to reduce taxes by shifting income
155
without running afoul of antiabuse rules.
Ultimately, however, to answer whether U.S.
MNCs or their foreign rivals are subject to stricter
antiabuse regimes requires evidence.
Unfortunately, quantitative evidence of the
amount by which CFC legislation raises the cost
of earning foreign profits for U.S.-domiciled
MNCs and for non-U.S.-domiciled MNCs is
lacking. However, in a 2012 working paper,
Robinson and Markle develop an index of the

153

The lack of evidence to support the claim that U.S.-domiciled
MNCs are able to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions more easily
and at lower cost than non-U.S.-domiciled MNCs is further
underscored by Robinson’s testimony, when she describes the
relative costs of complying with antiabuse regimes as follows:
It is entirely possible that, for a given profit generated in a
low-tax country, a non-U.S. MNC faces a higher tax burden
due to “strong” anti-abuse rules taxing those source country
profits in the MNC’s home country, while the U.S. firm faces
indefinite deferral of home country tax under “weak”
anti-abuse rules.
Robinson, supra note 26, at 2 n.5. And although Robinson
acknowledges that is costly for U.S. companies to keep cash
abroad, she describes the assumption that those costs are
lower for non-U.S. MNCs than for U.S. MNCs as “not clear.”
Id. at 5 (“There is evidence supporting the notion that U.S.
MNCs face non-trivial implicit costs of deferral that may put
them at a competitive disadvantage, but there is no
comparison of these costs to MNCs based in other countries.
Competing firms operating under territorial tax systems may
also bear implicit costs of avoiding home country tax through
the need to navigate anti-abuse rules in the home country. The
implicit cost is assumed to be low for non-U.S. MNCs, relative
to U.S. MNCs. However, the validity of this assumption is not
clear” (emphasis removed).).
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Cadbury-Schweppes, C-196/04 (Sept. 12, 2006).
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Two recent studies by German researchers examining the
impact of the 2006 Cadbury-Schweppes decision and its aftermath on
income shifting by EU-domiciled MNCs conclude that the EU’s
antiabuse rules are not very strict. Martin Ruf and Alfons
Weichenrieder examined the impact of the Cadbury-Schweppes
decision on the location of passive investments. They conclude that
the decision has led to substantial shifting of passive investments
within the EU, especially to low-taxed Ireland. They also find that
much of that shifting replaced shifting to tax havens outside
Europe. Ruf and Weichenrieder, “CFC Legislation, Passive Assets
and the Impact of the ECJ’s Cadbury-Schweppes Decision,” WU
International Taxation research paper no. 2014-02. Another group,
Rainer Brautigam, Christoph Stengel, and Frank Streif, examined
the effect of the CJEU’s Cadbury-Schweppes decision on capital
import and capital export neutrality. They find that the decision led
to substantial declines in effective tax rates, which suggests
widespread income shifting. Brautigam, Spengel, and Streif,
“Decline of CFC Rules and Rise of IP Boxes: How the ECJ Affects
Tax Competition and Economic Distortions in Europe,” ZEW
discussion paper no. 15-055 (2015).
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examples, their very language underscores the
lack of evidence for Kleinbard’s claim that nonU.S.-domiciled MNCs are subject to more
stringent antiabuse rules.
And later in his article, Kleinbard responds
directly to the argument that non-U.S. MNCs are
better able to shift income around than U.S.domiciled MNCs. His response is that the claim
“is not easily demonstrated, and it ignores antibase erosion developments like the OECD’s [base
erosion and profit-shifting] project or the EU’s
152
common consolidated corporate tax base.” To
support his claim that competitiveness has
nothing to do with inversions, Kleinbard has the
burden of showing either that U.S.-domiciled
MNCs are not taxed on foreign earnings
(including U.S. earnings shifted abroad) or that
non-U.S.-domiciled companies are subject to
stricter antiabuse rules. His statement here does
neither; it only asserts that the opposite view
cannot be readily shown. As for the other
developments, these reasons seem tenuous. The
BEPS project, which is under the auspices of the
OECD, applies to the United States as well as to
the EU. And the OECD produced its final BEPS
reports only in October 2015 — reports that have
yet to be implemented. Also, the EU’s common
corporate tax base project has not yet produced an
agreement, let alone been implemented.153

SPECIAL REPORT

156

Markle and Robinson, “Tax Haven Use Across International
Tax Regimes,” at 37, Table 2 (Nov. 2012).
157

Id.; Robinson, supra note 26, at 6 (“the U.S. ranks right in the
middle, in terms of the strength of its CFC legislation, among the
198 countries in the sample with CFC legislation”).
158

Markle, “A Comparison of the Tax-Motivated Income
Shifting of Multinationals in Territorial and Worldwide Countries,”
33 Contemp. Acct Res. 7 (2016).
159
160
161

Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.

not improve competitiveness) can be read to
conclude that there is no more income shifting with
worldwide parents than with territorial parents,
does not suggest that U.S. antiabuse laws are laxer
than those of other states and can therefore make up
for the higher tax and nontax costs from a
worldwide tax system. Thus, although foreign
antiabuse regimes might be sufficiently stricter than
those to which U.S. companies are subject so as to
offset the direct and indirect costs of the U.S.
deferred worldwide tax system, there is still no
evidence to support the conclusion that in practice
the antiabuse rules of any specific jurisdiction are
sufficiently stricter to offset the direct and indirect
costs incurred by U.S.-domiciled MNCs.
In summary, there is little evidence whether
the cost to U.S.-domiciled MNCs of worldwide
taxation with deferral plus the U.S. antiabuse
rules is greater than the cost to non-U.S. MNCs
domiciled in territorial states of complying with
their home states’ antiabuse regimes. We simply
lack the studies that would allow us to compare
the costs of being subject to different antiabuse
regimes based on the state of domicile. We
therefore cannot say confidently that non-U.S.
companies’ costs of dealing with antiabuse rules
are higher than those of their foreign rivals.
However, Kleinbard does not argue that we are
unsure whether the U.S. tax system
disadvantages U.S.-domiciled companies relative
to their foreign rivals on a cash flow basis, but
rather argues that the U.S. tax system does not so
disadvantage U.S.-domiciled MNCs. Given the
strong evidence that U.S. companies incur costs
from deferral, and the lack of evidence that those
costs are offset by the costs of non-U.S.-domiciled
MNCs complying with their home-country CFC
regimes, Kleinbard’s strong claim that
competitiveness arguments for inversions are
baseless is itself only conjecture and is
inconsistent with the weight of evidence, which
shows that for U.S.-domiciled MNCs, there are
nontrivial costs of holding large amounts of
untaxed cash offshore in foreign subsidiaries.
C. The Emerson ‘Competitiveness Fable’
Kleinbard seeks to support his argument that
U.S.-domiciled MNCs are not at a competitive
disadvantage relative to non-U.S.-domiciled
MNCs on either a financial accounting or cash flow
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strength of countries’ CFC legislation. Their index
is comparative, even if it does not translate
directly into measurable costs. Robinson and
Markle examined the cross-border tax systems of
28 countries. They classify 10 of them — including
Austria, Belgium, India, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Russia, and Switzerland — as not having CFC
regimes.156 Among the 18 countries in the sample
with CFC regimes, they find that the United States
157
is in the middle of the pack. That is hardly
strong evidence that U.S. MNCs are subject to
laxer antiabuse rules than their rivals, and it is no
support for the notion that stricter antiabuse
regimes offset the positive direct and indirect tax
costs U.S. companies incur on foreign earnings —
costs that seem likely even if they cannot be
readily quantified.
A recently published article by Markle further
questions the notion that non-U.S.-based MNCs are
subject to stricter antiabuse regimes than U.S.-based
158
MNCs. He looks at whether income shifting
occurs more frequently when parent corporations
are domiciled in jurisdictions with territorial or
worldwide tax systems. His main result, which is
based on data from 2004 to 2008, is that income
shifting is more prevalent among corporations
domiciled in territorial states than among
159
corporations domiciled in worldwide states.
Markle further decomposes his results into income
shifted among foreign subsidiaries and income
shifted from a domestic corporation (either the
parent or a subsidiary) to a foreign subsidiary. He
concludes that shifting income among foreign
subsidiaries is as common, regardless of where the
parent is located.160 However, shifting income out
from the state of domicile is more common when the
161
parent is domiciled in a territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, Markle’s study, which at best (from the
perspective of Kleinbard’s claim that inversions do
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Galvin, supra note 10, as quoted in Kleinbard, supra note 17,
at 1061-1062.
163
164
165
166
167

Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1063-1064.
Id. at 1063.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1064.

However, in all actual corporate acquisitions, there are
likely to be nontax differences across competing
bidders. The possibility of those differences alone does
not undercut the claim that taxes can have an effect on
which corporation acquires any particular company.
Second, Kleinbard contends that the
difference between Schneider’s and Emerson’s
global ETRs are not nearly large enough to
account for the difference in bid prices. As
described by Kleinbard, APC’s global ETR was 26
percent in 2003, 25 percent in 2004, and 22 percent
168
in 2003. Schneider’s French GAAP global ETR
was “a bit higher, in the 28 to 29 percent range.”169
Throughout the same period, Emerson’s
companywide ETR was higher still, “close to the
statutory 35 percent rate.”170 According to
Kleinbard, “on its face, this 20 percent difference
in the offers that the two firms made is an
implausibly large premium to attribute to tax rate
171
differentials.”
Fair enough. Nonetheless, the difference
between Schneider’s and Emerson’s global ETRs
potentially translates into a large difference in
valuation. Assuming that both companies made
their investment decisions using their global ETRs
(the only tax rates Kleinbard discusses regarding
the transaction), Emerson would use a 35 percent
tax rate, and Schneider would use, say, a 28.5
percent rate, the midpoint between 28 and 29
percent. Thus, Schneider would expect to report
to its shareholders on an after-tax financial
accounting basis 71.5 percent of APC’s earnings.
Emerson, in contrast, would expect to report only
65 percent of APC’s earnings. Thus, applying each
potential acquirer’s global ETR to APC’s earnings,
Schneider would report 6.5 cents (or 10 percent)
more of after-tax earnings than would Emerson
172
on every dollar earned by APC. Assuming both
companies used the same discount rate to value
the same investments (a common assumption
because it isolates tax effects), Schneider would
place a 10 percent higher value on the same pretax
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Id. at 1063.
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Id.
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Id. at 1062.

171

Id. at 1063.
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For every dollar earned by APC, Schneider would report
after-tax earnings of 71.5 cents, whereas Emerson would report
only 65 cents.

TAX NOTES, MAY 1, 2017

647
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com.

(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

basis by debunking a “competitiveness fable”
corporate managers tell about how the U.S. tax
system disadvantages U.S. MNCs in their
competition with foreign rivals. In 2006 Emerson
Electric, a U.S. corporation, sought to acquire
another U.S.-domiciled corporation, American
Power Conversion (APC), which had more than
half its earnings outside the United States.
Emerson was outbid by Schneider Electric, a
French corporation, which ultimately acquired
APC for $6 billion, a 30 percent premium over
APC’s stock price and $1 billion (20 percent) more
than Emerson’s highest offer. According to
Emerson’s CFO at the time, Walter Galvin,
Schneider was able to outbid Emerson for APC
because Emerson had to pay U.S. taxes on
Schneider’s non-U.S. earnings at nearly 40 percent
(including both federal and state taxes), whereas
Schneider would be taxed at less than 2 percent on
those same earnings.162 In Galvin’s opinion, France’s
territorial tax system, coupled with the U.S.
worldwide tax system, made it possible for
Schneider to outbid Emerson for APC. Kleinbard
strongly disagrees.
Kleinbard’s responses to Galvin’s claim fall into
four broad categories. First, Kleinbard argues that
there are alternative nontax justifications for why
163
Schneider might outbid Emerson. Second, he
argues that the difference in bid prices is so large that
164
it cannot be explained by taxes. Third, he contends
that Emerson’s competitiveness argument is
misplaced because APC was a U.S. corporation at the
165
time of its acquisition. Fourth, Kleinbard wryly
notes that shortly after its failure to acquire APC,
Emerson was able to acquire a different (foreign)
166
corporation. I address each of these arguments in
turn.
First, Kleinbard maintains that Schneider outbid
Emerson for APC because Schneider had a young,
ambitious president and because APC was likely a
better strategic fit with Schneider than with
167
Emerson. Those are certainly plausible explanations.
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Chloride shows that U.S.-based MNCs are not
disadvantaged, because they can acquire foreign
173
firms. Of course, it is no more reasonable to
conclude from Emerson’s failure to acquire APC
that U.S.-based MNCs are at a tax-induced
competitive disadvantage than it is to conclude
the opposite — that because Emerson acquired
Chloride, U.S.-based MNCs are not at a
disadvantage — which is precisely Kleinbard’s
point.
Kleinbard, however, misses an important
difference (at least in Galvin’s telling) between the
APC and Chloride transactions. At the time they
were acquired, Chloride was a much smaller
company than APC. Emerson acquired Chloride
for $1.5 billion, whereas Schneider acquired APC
for $6 billion. According to Galvin, Emerson
acquired Chloride using offshore cash. That cash,
which would have been subject to tax upon
repatriation, was not fully available for Emerson
to use as it liked. Instead, it was locked offshore,
which means that it was subject to an ongoing cost
(explicit or implicit) that would not apply if the
income had been repatriated. The implication is
that offshore cash is a cheaper form of financing
overseas acquisitions for U.S.-based MNCs,
whereas new equity and U.S. cash are more
expensive forms of financing. There is thus no
logical inconsistency in Galvin’s claim that the
U.S. tax system makes it more difficult for U.S.based MNCs to make large overseas acquisitions
but easier for them to make small ones. The two
arguments are the opposite sides of the same coin.
Because of deferral, the debate whether the
U.S. tax system disadvantages U.S.-domiciled
MNCs in foreign markets comes down to whether
it is costly for U.S. MNCs to hold cash in their
foreign subsidiaries. If there is no cost, there is no
disadvantage, because cash held by foreign
subsidiaries is as valuable as cash held by the
domestic parent (and its U.S. affiliates). If,
however, overseas cash is subject to explicit or
implicit taxation, U.S.-domiciled MNCs are at a
tax disadvantage when they are looking to invest
U.S. cash overseas, because they will incur the
added cost of earning overseas cash that their
foreign rivals will not. In other words, parent
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Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1064-1065.
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earnings than would Emerson. That difference is
insufficient to account for the full difference in bid
prices (20 percent), and it does not equal the
statutory difference in rates (nearly 40 percent),
but a 10 percent difference in valuation is certainly
substantial.
Although Kleinbard might be correct that
taxes cannot account for the full difference in bid
prices between Schneider and Emerson, he would
be wrong about the general proposition that U.S.
companies are in as good a position as their
foreign rivals in the competition to acquire other
corporations. Thus, viewed through the lens of
global ETRs, the APC example shows, if anything,
that Emerson was at a large tax disadvantage
relative to Schneider.
Of course, the above discussion focused
exclusively on global ETRs. If we looked at
Emerson’s and Schneider’s jurisdiction-specific
ETRs or MTRs, we might reach very different
results. However, we do not know what those
were, and Kleinbard does not discuss the
possibilities. Moreover, we do not know how
Emerson and Schneider incorporated taxes into
their valuation processes, so we do not know
what tax rates they used to value APC.
Third, Kleinbard points out that APC was not
a foreign-domiciled corporation but rather a U.S.domiciled corporation, so Schneider, by
purchasing Emerson rather than removing APC’s
earnings from the ambit of U.S. taxation instead
further entwined itself in the U.S. tax system.
Although APC’s U.S. domicile complicates the
argument that Emerson was at a tax
disadvantage, APC’s U.S. domicile alone does not
rebut the claim that Schneider had a tax
advantage over Emerson. For the reasons
described above, APC’s (future) foreign earnings
and cash flow might be more valuable to
Schneider than to Emerson. Also, APC’s (future)
U.S. earnings and cash flow might be more
valuable to Schneider because it might have been
better able to strip earnings out of the United
States than Emerson.
Fourth and finally, Kleinbard’s coup de grace
is to point out that four years after Emerson’s
unsuccessful attempt to acquire APC, it acquired
Chloride Group, a U.K. corporation, outbidding
ABB, a Swiss-domiciled corporation. Kleinbard
argues that Emerson’s 2010 acquisition of
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D. Other Explanations for Inversions
Kleinbard rejects the idea that U.S.-domiciled
MNCs invert to improve their competitiveness
because, according to Kleinbard, U.S.-domiciled
MNCs are not at a disadvantage relative to their
foreign rivals. Instead, Kleinbard offers two
174
alternative justifications for inversions.
Kleinbard believes the principal reason why
U.S. MNCs invert is that they are seeking to gain
175
access to their large offshore stores of cash. As
he describes it:

The best of the stateless income planners
are drowning in low-taxed overseas cash,
which today earns only negligible rates of
interest. The meager earnings on the cash
drag down earnings per share, while
shareholders focus with laser intensity on
that cash as more usefully deployed
directly in their hands.
It is less than a secret that firms in this
position really have no intention at all of
“permanently” reinvesting the cash
overseas, but instead are counting the
days until the money can be used to goose
share prices through stock buybacks and
176
dividends.
Thus, according to Kleinbard, U.S. MNCs are
engaging in inversions to put their hands on their
large overseas stocks of low-taxed and untaxed
cash so they can use those funds to repurchase
shares and raise their stock price.
Although Kleinbard offers accessing offshore
stockpiles of cash as an alternative to improving
competitiveness as a justification for inversions, the
two justifications are not as far apart as they might at
first seem. In fact, the two justifications are closely
related. The connection is perhaps easiest to see by
examining the outbound argument. In the
outbound argument, the claim is that companies
invert because they seek to reduce the tax burden on
their future overseas earnings; in Kleinbard’s
accessing cash argument, companies invert to access
prior earnings held offshore. Thus, both arguments
are predicated on the value of reaching earnings
held offshore, which are worth more to the
company, its managers, and investors when they
can be freely accessed without additional tax cost.
The difference is that Kleinbard’s argument focuses
on those earnings only after they have been earned.
In contrast, the competitiveness argument takes a
step back in time and recognizes that before those
earnings are earned, they will be worth more if they
can be accessed immediately or whenever desired
177
without having to incur a repatriation tax.

176

Id.
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I consider only Kleinbard’s economic justifications.
Kleinbard notes that there can also be psychological motivations
for undertaking a transaction such as an inversion, but he prefers to
focus on the economic rationales rather than psychological
motives. Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1066-1067.
175

Id. at 1065-1066.
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The same relationship holds for the inbound argument.
Kleinbard argues that U.S. MNCs strip income out of the United
States and into low-tax jurisdictions and that U.S. MNCs invert to
access prior earnings without additional tax. According to the
inbound competitiveness argument, U.S. MNCs invert to access
their future U.S. earnings more easily and cheaply.
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company financing (U.S. cash or new equity of the
U.S. parent) is a relatively expensive source of
capital for U.S. MNCs’ overseas investments
because if the investment succeeds, there is an
incremental cost that non-U.S. MNCs do not
incur. Conversely, because the cash held by the
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs is subject to
explicit taxation or to the implicit cost of deferring
taxation, U.S. MNCs’ overseas cash provides a
relatively inexpensive source of capital for
acquisitions. Thus, Galvin’s claims about APC
and Chloride are not contradictory (although they
are not established and backed up by Galvin,
either), so Chloride (without more) is not the
counterpoint Kleinbard takes it to be.
Viewed through the only lens into the
acquisition of APC that Kleinbard provides —
global ETRs — Galvin’s story is broadly
supported by Kleinbard’s data and comments.
Although Schneider’s global ETR was not so
much lower than Emerson’s to account for the full
20 percent difference in bid prices, the difference
in global ETRs could account for a 10 percent
difference, half of the bid price difference. Also,
from a cash flow perspective, Chloride’s
substantially smaller size than APC (as well as
Chloride’s foreign domicile) is consistent with the
notion that new cash or equity is an expensive
acquisition currency, whereas preexisting,
untaxed offshore cash is an inexpensive currency.
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services industries — say, a large chain of
retail drugstores — actually pay federal
corporate tax at effective rates not that far
removed from the statutory rate.
Companies in this situation have every
reason to feel aggrieved that Congress has
not addressed the high statutory rate, which
burdens them disproportionately. An
inversion transaction does little for those
firms regarding their offshore cash, because
they typically have little or none in a tax
haven kitty, but the creation of an offshore
parent located in a tax treaty jurisdiction
does permit easy earnings stripping of the
U.S. tax base on domestic operating income
through newly created internal leverage, up
to the ceiling set by section 163(j). But that
ceiling is far too high, because it basically
allows firms to strip out 50 percent of their
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation,
and amortization. After depreciation and
amortization reduce what remains, there are
180
slim pickings left for the U.S. Treasury.
Thus, Kleinbard argues that the second reason
why U.S. MNCs are inverting is so they can shift
income that would otherwise be taxed in the
181
United States to lower-taxed jurisdictions. That
is not a backward-looking rationale for
inversions, as was the rationale Kleinbard offered
regarding foreign markets. Instead, that is a
forward-looking account, which provides a
rationale for companies to invert in order to
reduce their effective taxes on future earnings.
This second rationale is a surprising reason for
inversions for Kleinbard to offer in a piece
promoting the idea that tax inversions are
unrelated to competitiveness. That is because that
rationale is what I describe as the inbound
182
competitiveness rationale for inversions.
In summary, Kleinbard, in an article that
purports to debunk the claim that U.S.-domiciled
MNCs undertake inversions to improve their
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Indeed, the block quote in which Kleinbard puts forth the
accessing cash rationale is full of language similar to the language
from the cash flow argument that worldwide taxation
disadvantages U.S. MNCs. Thus, Kleinbard talks of U.S. MNCs
holding cash “that earns only negligible rates of interest” that
“drag down earnings per share” to the detriment of shareholders
who recognize that such cash could be “more usefully deployed
directly in their hands.” Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1066.
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Felipe Cortes et al., “The Effect of Inversions on Corporate
Governance” (Oct. 25, 2016).
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Kleinbard, supra note 17, at 1065-1066.
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Id. at 1066.
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Kleinbard, however, would seem to acknowledge this
possibility for U.S. corporations without substantial overseas
operations. Whether he also maintains that U.S.-domiciled
companies can reduce their taxes on U.S. income when the
company already has substantial foreign operations is not clear.
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Of course, competitiveness arguments for
inversions and Kleinbard’s principal reason for
inversions are not in conflict. It is possible that by
changing domicile, inverting companies are
trying to both access past earnings with minimal
tax cost and reduce the tax cost on their future
earnings. Indeed, the two reasons are closely
related. Both are derived from the U.S. worldwide
tax system, which reduces the value to U.S.domiciled MNCs of earnings held overseas
relative to the value those earnings have to MNCs
domiciled in territorial states. Because untaxed
earnings held overseas are worth less to U.S.domiciled MNCs than to MNCs domiciled in
territorial jurisdictions, U.S.-domiciled MNCs
have an incentive to invert: so they can realize the
full value of their accumulated overseas earnings
178
without taxation. Similarly, U.S. MNCs that
expect to have large overseas earnings in the
future also have an incentive to invert: so they can
realize the full value of their expected future
earnings without taxation.
Accordingly, I do not disagree with Kleinbard
that gaining access to large amounts of overseas
cash is one reason why U.S. MNCs invert.
However, gaining access to previously untaxed
offshore cash is not the only reason why
companies seek to invert. After all, not all
inverting companies already hold large offshore
stocks of cash, and some high-profile proposed
inversions, such as Walgreen’s aborted inversion,
involve companies with little offshore cash.179
That leads to Kleinbard’s second reason for
why U.S. firms engage in inversions:
The other reason for the wave of inversions
relates to the same existential despair over
the failure of Congress to engage with
fundamental corporate tax reform, but this
time the focus shifts to the tax imposed on
U.S. domestic income. Many domesticcentric U.S. firms, particularly those in the
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IV. Conclusion

alternative justifications for inversions do not
undercut the outbound and inbound
competitiveness arguments but in fact support
those claims.
Accordingly, despite Kleinbard’s claim that
competitiveness has nothing to do with
inversions, improving competitiveness remains a
strong reason for U.S.-domiciled companies to
invert. Although improving competitiveness
might not be the only reason to invert (and we do
not have a good sense of the magnitude of the
advantage), improving competitiveness is and
remains a powerful motivation for inverting. And
policies intended to curb inversions that ignore
this state of affairs are likely to create tensions and
produce adverse effects.


Kleinbard’s principal thesis in his 2014 article
is that inversions are in no way motivated by a
desire to improve the competitiveness of U.S.domiciled MNCs, because U.S.-domiciled MNCs
are not at a tax-induced competitive disadvantage
relative to their non-U.S. rivals. According to
Kleinbard, the U.S. worldwide tax system does
not disadvantage U.S. MNCs relative to their
foreign rivals domiciled in states with territorial
tax systems, and hence they cannot eliminate any
tax-induced disadvantage by inverting. As
described above, that claim implies that U.S.domiciled MNCs are not disadvantaged relative
to their foreign rivals from either a financial
accounting perspective or a cash flow perspective
in the competition to earn income in either foreign
markets or the domestic market.
However, the data and studies available,
either today or in 2014 when Kleinbard published
his article, do not establish that U.S.-domiciled
MNCs are not disadvantaged relative to their
foreign rivals from either a financial accounting
(global ETR) or a cash flow perspective in either
foreign or domestic markets. The data are at best
inconclusive. Most of the data, in fact, are
consistent with and support the opposite view
regarding the competitive disadvantage of U.S.domiciled MNCs and thus the view that they can
improve their competitive position by inverting.
Moreover, Emerson’s unsuccessful attempt to
acquire APC is not a “competitiveness fable” but
an illustration of the powerful impact taxes can
have on competitiveness. And finally, Kleinbard’s
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competitiveness, offers two alternative
justifications to account for inversions. The
opposition between his proffered rationales for
inversions and the standard competitiveness
arguments is not as sharp as Kleinbard apparently
thinks. One of his justifications is a straightforward statement of the inbound account (from
either a financial accounting or cash flow
perspective), and the other is very close to the cash
flow version of the outbound account. The latter
differs from the outbound account in that
Kleinbard considers only previously earned
stocks of untaxed and undertaxed income,
ignoring the value from accumulating untaxed
and undertaxed income in the future.

